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GREECE AND THE UNITED NATIONS, 1946-49

A SUMMARY ACCOUNT

by Harry N. Howard

I. General

Since 1946-47, the United States has been concerned with the problem of threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. Through the United Nations it has sought to preserve the integrity of Greece against the actions of her northern neighbors and to find some solution of the problems therein involved. Through its aid missions, American Aid to Greece and the Economic Cooperation Administration, it has sought to help Greece to regain the capacity to cope with the Communist attempt to overthrow the constitutional system in Greece, and to assist that country along the road toward social and economic reconstruction.

II. The Greek Problem in the Security Council, 1946-47

CONSIDERATION OF THE GREEK PROBLEM IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council first considered the problem of Greece as a result of a letter of the representative of the U.S.S.R. on January 21, 1946 under article 35 of the Charter which charged that the presence of British troops in Greece was a threat to international peace and security.¹ Since no disposition was made on the part of the Security Council, however, to agree with the Soviet thesis, the charge was not sustained. The Greek question came before the Security Council for a second time in August 1947 as a result of a cable from the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs on August 24, 1946, under article 34 of the Charter which

¹ For details see *The United Nations and the Problem of Greece*, Department of State publication 2909, pp. 1-3.

charged this time that the policy of the Greek Government had produced a situation in the Balkans endangering international peace and security. The question was discussed between August 28 and September 30, 1946, but once more the Security Council declined to accept the Soviet thesis.

Since December 1946, the United Nations has been especially concerned with the problems of threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. The problem of Greece was brought to the attention of the Security Council for the third time when, on December 3, 1946, the representative of Greece, under articles 34 and 35 (1) of the Charter, requested that the Security Council give early consideration to a situation which, it was charged, was leading to friction between Greece, on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other. The Greek Government declared that the guerrilla movement in Greece was receiving support from Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, that groups of men were trained for guerrilla activities in Greece, and that foreign assistance had been given to the guerrillas.

THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION

On December 19 the Security Council unanimously approved a resolution establishing a Commission of Investigation² on which the 11 members of that body were represented and to which liaison representatives of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia were attached. This Commission which was to make an on-the-spot investigation in order to ascertain the facts as to the disturbed situation along the northern frontiers of Greece,

² For the work of this Commission see particularly U.N. doc. S/360: *Report by the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents to the Security Council*, May 23, 1947, vs. I-III; and *The United Nations and the Problem of Greece*, cited, pp. 3-26.

signed its report in Geneva on May 23, 1947. Among other things, it found that Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia had, in fact, been assisting the Greek guerrilla movement, as charged, and it proposed that the Security Council recommend that the four parties concerned do their best to establish normal and good neighborly relations, abstain from any action likely to maintain or increase the tension in the frontier region, and refrain from any support of elements in neighboring countries aiming at the overthrow of the lawful governments of those countries. Secondly, the Commission proposed that the four parties enter into new frontier conventions along the lines of the Greek-Bulgarian convention of 1931. It was also suggested that a body be established to investigate frontier violations or complaints, use its good offices, make studies and investigations, and report to the Security Council. Finally it was suggested that the proposed commission study the question of international refugees and the practicability of the voluntary transfer of minorities.

The representatives of the U.S.S.R. and Poland, who held the Government of Greece solely responsible for the troubled situation along the northern frontiers, subscribed neither to the conclusions of the Commission nor to its recommendations.

III. The General Assembly and the Problem of Greece, 1947-49

THE QUESTION OF THE "THREAT TO POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF GREECE," SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1947

The Security Council discussed the Greek problem during June, July, and August 1947, but because of five Soviet vetoes, it was unable to reach any decision. The question was taken off the agenda of the Security Council on September 15 on the motion of the United States representative, and on September 23 the General Assembly decided to place the question of "threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece" on its agenda.³ On October 21, 1947, the General Assembly, by a vote of 40 to 6, with 11 abstentions, approved a resolution establishing the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, with representatives of 11 nations, although the U.S.S.R. and Poland refused to serve, and endowed it with powers of observation and conciliation, in

³For convenient reference see *The General Assembly and the Problem of Greece*, The Department of State Bulletin Supplement, Dec. 7, 1947.

general accord with the recommendations of the original Commission of Investigation. Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia were called upon forthwith to cease giving assistance to the Greek guerrilla movement and Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia were called upon to cooperate in the settlement of their disputes by peaceful means. To that end it was recommended that the four parties concerned:

- (1) Establish normal diplomatic and good neighborly relations among themselves as soon as possible;
- (2) Establish frontier conventions providing for effective machinery for the regulation and control of their common frontiers and the peaceful settlement of frontier incidents and disputes;
- (3) Cooperate in the settlement of the problems arising out of the presence of refugees in the four states concerned;
- (4) Study the practicability for concluding agreements for the voluntary transfer of minorities.⁴

THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE BALKANS, 1947-48

The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, composed of the active representation of Australia, Brazil, China, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, began its work in Greece in November 1947, and has continued to sit in that country, either in Salonika (December 1947-July 1948) or in Athens (July 1948-49).

In its first report to the General Assembly,⁵ signed at Geneva on June 30, 1948, the Special

⁴For text see *Ibid.*, pp. 1121-1122, and resolution 100 (II).

⁵See U.N. doc. A/574: *Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans*, p. 36. The Special Committee had previously submitted two interim reports to the Secretary-General, on Dec. 31, 1947 (U.N. doc. A/521) and Jan. 10, 1948 (U.N. doc. A/522). For convenience these reports, together with that of June 30, 1948, may be found in *Documents and State Papers*, September 1948, pp. 373-375, and 376-412. It may also be noted that a supplementary report of the Special Committee on the Balkans was signed on Sept. 10, 1948 (U.N. doc. A/644) and an interim report was signed on Oct. 22, 1948 (U.N. doc. A/692). The supplementary report and the third interim report which gave further details and confirmed the conclusions reached on June 30, 1948, may be found respectively in *Documents and State Papers*, September 1948, pp. 413-423, and January 1949, pp. 603-608.

Committee unanimously reached a number of conclusions. Although it had consistently endeavored to establish normal diplomatic and good neighborly relations between Greece and its northern neighbors, only the Government of Greece cooperated with it in any way. Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia not only refused to cooperate with it but also refused to recognize it as a legitimate body of the United Nations. The Special Committee was therefore unable substantially to assist the four governments concerning (1) the establishment of normal relations, (2) frontier conventions, (3) political refugees, and (4) voluntary transfer of minorities. It was evident to the Committee that good neighborly relations did not exist between Greece and her northern neighbors. Moreover it appeared to the Special Committee that the Greek guerrillas were receiving assistance from Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Because of the character and scale of the support, it was the view of the Special Committee that it had been given "with the knowledge of the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia." The Committee was convinced that as long as the situation along the northern frontiers indicated such support, a threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece would exist and international peace and security in the Balkans would be endangered. Despite the refusal of the northern neighbors of Greece to cooperate with it, the Special Committee was also convinced that it would be possible to assist the four governments concerned toward a peaceful settlement in the interest of all if Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, like Greece, were prepared to act in accordance with the resolution of October 21, 1947, and in the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

The Special Committee made a number of recommendations in its report of June 30, 1948. The first of these stated that as long as the disturbed conditions continued it was essential that an agency of the United Nations be entrusted with the functions of "exercising vigilance" along the northern frontiers of Greece and of endeavoring to bring about a peaceful settlement. It also recommended that the General Assembly consider "ways and means of obtaining the cooperation of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia with the Special Committee."

* For a summary of the discussion see "The Problem of Greece in the General Assembly," *Documents and State Papers*, January 1949.

THE THIRD GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE GREEK PROBLEM, 1948

The General Assembly again considered the Greek question at its third session in Paris in the autumn of 1948.* After a long discussion, by a vote of 47 to 6, with no abstentions, on November 27, 1948, the General Assembly adopted a resolution continuing the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans with clarified terms of reference concerning its work of observation and conciliation. The General Assembly took note of the conclusions of the Special Committee as to the assistance of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to the Greek guerrillas and that a continuation of this situation constituted a threat to the independence and integrity of Greece and to peace in the Balkans and that the conduct of these countries had been "inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations." A second resolution, unanimously approved, also recommended resumption of diplomatic relations between Greece and her northern neighbors, the drafting or renewal of frontier conventions, and the settlement of the refugee problem. Finally, the General Assembly unanimously approved a resolution concerning the repatriation of some 25 thousand Greek children who had been removed primarily to the territories of the northern neighbors of Greece.

It should also be noted that the First Committee (Political and Security) of the General Assembly, on November 10, 1948, established a "Conciliation Committee" under the chairmanship of Dr. H. V. Evatt, President of the General Assembly, to explore methods and procedure with the representatives of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia, looking toward a settlement of their difficulties. By the close of the session in December, draft agreements had been prepared and Dr. Evatt had reported some progress, especially as to the possible establishment of mixed frontier commissions and the drafting of frontier conventions, although the Albanian Government refused to sign any agreement unless Greece gave a formal renunciation to her long-standing claim to northern Epirus, and the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments refused to sign unless the Albanian Government signed. Subsequently, during the second part of the third session at New York, the Greek Government, on May 11, 1949, substantially accepted Dr. Evatt's proposals, but no reply was received from the other governments concerned.

Meanwhile the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans continued its work although it suspended its conciliation role until the "Conciliation Committee" headed by Dr. Evatt had terminated its work and submitted a report. In its unanimous report to the fourth session of the General Assembly⁷ signed on August 2, 1949, in Athens, the Special Committee notes that "Albania is the principal source of material assistance" to the Greek guerrillas. The report declares that Albanian support has been "vital to the continuance of the Greek guerrilla movement since all the main guerrilla concentrations are found on the Albanian frontier."⁸ It also points out that Bulgaria has continued to assist the Greek guerrillas, moral assistance to whom has been openly proclaimed by the Bulgarian Government.⁹

On the other hand, it is indicated that Yugoslav assistance has recently declined if it has not ceased, following the Yugoslav-Cominform rift in 1948, and note is made of Marshal Tito's speech of July 10, 1949, concerning closure of the Greek-Yugoslav frontier.¹⁰ The report stresses the very important assistance of Rumania to the Greek guerrillas, including the fact that the "Free Greece" radio has been moved from the neighborhood of Belgrade to the vicinity of Bucharest, and states that this assistance—together with that of the other Soviet satellites, points toward "the existence of a highly coordinated system of support" to the Greek guerrilla movement.¹¹ As the report declares, on a number of occasions the Greek guerrillas have openly acknowledged their foreign support, as stated by the Greek Communist Party itself on January 30-31, 1949, when it proclaimed "in the Popular Democracies we found great and wholehearted support without which we could not have made progress."¹²

Among other things, the report calls attention to the fact that none of the approximately 25 thousand Greek children removed from Greece to the territories of her northern neighbors during 1948 have been returned to Greece in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the General Assembly

on November 27, 1948. Nevertheless, thousands of Greek children, contrary to the spirit of that resolution, have been transferred from one Soviet satellite state to another.¹³ Moreover "in violation of fundamental humanitarian principles some of these children, both boys and girls of adolescent age, have been sent back to Greece to fight in the ranks of the guerrillas."¹⁴ The report outlines the conciliatory efforts of the Special Committee, noting that its conciliatory role was suspended for 5 months during 1949 to avoid duplicating the efforts of the Conciliation Committee of which Dr. H. V. Evatt was chairman.¹⁵ The Special Committee, however, immediately resumed this role after the termination of Dr. Evatt's activities. Although the Soviet Union and Poland refused to cooperate in the work of the Special Committee and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia refused to cooperate or even to recognize it, documents of the Committee were sent regularly to these governments, and the Committee remained available to assist Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia in the solution of their difficulties.

The report concludes that "the continuance of the present situation 'constitutes a threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece and to peace in the Balkans'", reaffirming conclusions which the Special Committee had reached in 1948. The report contains no recommendations which are to be the subject of a supplementary report before the General Assembly takes up the Greek problem in the autumn of 1949.

TEXT OF REPORT OF U. N. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE BALKANS

General Assembly Official Records:
Fourth Session
Supplement No. 8 (A/935)

Chapter I. Creation, Function and Organization of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans

A. THE GREEK QUESTION BEFORE THE THIRD REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[EDITOR'S NOTE: The six annexes that appear in Supplement No. 8 (A/935) are not printed here; annexes 3, 4, and 5 will, however, appear in a separate print of Dr. Howard's article and the report. The separate also will include a complete chronology of the Greek case from 1946 to the present.]

⁷ *Ibid.*, par. 136.

⁸ *Ibid.*, par. 144.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pars. 27, 31, 33, and annex 5.

⁷ See U.N. doc. A/935: *Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans*, pp. 1-25, with four maps.

⁸ *Ibid.*, par. 56.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pars. 88-139.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pars. 41, 52, and 152.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, par. 145.

¹² *Ibid.*, par. 67.

1. The problem of Greece has been one of the most persistent confronting the United Nations. When it came before the Security Council for the third time in the year 1946, a Commission of Investigation was established to ascertain the causes and the nature of the border violations and disturbances reported along the northern frontiers of Greece. The Security Council was unable, however, to reach any decision¹ and finally, on 15 September 1947, removed the question from its agenda. The problem was immediately submitted by the United States of America to the General Assembly at its second regular session under the title "Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece". On 21 October 1947, after prolonged debate, the General Assembly adopted, by 40 votes to 6, with 11 abstentions, resolution 109 (II),² the terms of which were similar in many respects to the proposals contained in the report of the Security Council's Commission of Investigation.³ This resolution established the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans to assist Greece on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other, to achieve a peaceful solution of their disputes and to observe their compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly.

2. In accordance with its mandate the Special Committee reported⁴ to the General Assembly which, at the first part of its third regular session held in Paris, again debated the question of Greece at great length. On 27 November 1948, by 47 votes to 6, with no abstentions, the General Assembly adopted resolution 193 (III) A,⁵ which maintained the Special Committee in being with its functions of conciliation and observation, confirming in more explicit terms the substance of the resolution of 1947 and supplementing it by the introduction of new elements.

3. In 1947 the General Assembly had limited itself, in the preface of its resolution, to noting that the Commission of Investigation had found "by a majority vote" that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had given assistance and support to the guerrillas fighting against the Greek Government.⁶ In 1948, however, the General Assembly was more

explicit. It noted the unanimous conclusions of the Special Committee that the Greek guerrillas had "continued to receive aid and assistance on a large scale from Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, with the knowledge of the Governments of those countries"; that the guerrillas in the frontier zones had "been largely dependent on external supply", had "frequently moved at will in territory across the frontier for tactical reasons" and had "frequently retired safely into the territory of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia when the Greek Army exerted great pressure".⁷ The General Assembly noted further the Special Committee's conclusion that the continued aid given by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia "endangers peace in the Balkans and is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations".⁸

4. Similarly, while in 1947 the General Assembly had simply called upon "Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to do nothing which would furnish aid and assistance to the said guerrillas"⁹ the injunction was made more positive in November 1948 when Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were called upon "to cease forthwith rendering any assistance or support in any form to the guerrillas in fighting against the Greek Government, including the use of their territories as a base for the preparation or launching of armed action".¹⁰

5. In 1948, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were called upon "to co-operate with Greece in the settlement of their dispute by peaceful means" in accordance with the original recommendations of 1947. These recommendations were:

"(1) That they establish normal diplomatic and good neighbourly relations among themselves as soon as possible;

"(2) That they establish frontier conventions providing for effective machinery for the regulation and control of their common frontiers and for the pacific settlement of frontier incidents and disputes,

"(3) That they co-operate in the settlement of the problems arising out of the presence of refugees in the four States concerned through voluntary repatriation wherever possible and that they take effective measures to prevent the participation of such refugees in political or military activity;

"(4) That they study the practicability of concluding agreements for the voluntary transfer of minorities."¹¹

6. In addition to calling upon the three Governments concerned to cease rendering aid to the guerrillas, the General Assembly recommended

¹ Annex 1, res. 193 (III) A, par. 2.

² *Ibid.*, par. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, res. 109 (II), par. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, res. 193 (III) A, par. 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, res. 109 (II), par. 5.

¹ For report of the Commission of Investigation, see S/360; for summary of Security Council proceedings, see A/366, pp. 24-32.

² For the texts of resolutions adopted during the second and third regular sessions of the General Assembly on 21 October 1947, 10 November 1948 and 27 November 1948, see annex 1 to the present report. [EDITOR'S NOTE: For references to annex 1, see the following: resolution 109 (II), adopted Oct. 21, 1947, see BULLETIN of Oct. 26, 1947, p. 823; Resolution Establishing a Conciliation Committee, adopted on Nov. 10, 1948, see BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1948, p. 698; resolution 193 (III) parts A, B, and C, adopted on Nov. 27, 1948, see BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1948, p. 697, and BULLETIN of Dec. 12, 1948, p. 722.]

³ See S/360, pp. 248-251.

⁴ A/574, A/644, A/692.

⁵ Annex 1, res. 193 (III) A.

⁶ *Ibid.*, res. 109 (II), par. 3.

"to all Members of the United Nations and to all other States that their Governments refrain from any action designed to assist directly or through any other Government any armed group fighting against the Greek Government".¹²

7. The Special Committee was not only maintained in being with the functions of conciliation and observation conferred upon it by the resolution of 1947, but express authorization was also given to continue to utilize the observation groups¹³ which had been established by the Special Committee early in 1948 to enable it to carry out its task of observing and reporting on the response of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to the injunction of the General Assembly not to furnish aid to the Greek guerrillas.¹⁴

8. Furthermore, the Special Committee was authorized, in assisting the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia to implement the two resolutions,¹⁵ to appoint at its discretion and "utilize the services and good offices of one or more persons whether or not members of the Special Committee".¹⁶

9. The General Assembly, on 27 November 1948, adopted unanimously two further resolutions concerning the Greek question but these did not mention the Special Committee. The first not only recommended to Albania and Bulgaria on the one hand 'and Greece on the other' the resumption of diplomatic relations and to all four Governments concerned the renewal or drafting of frontier conventions and the settlement of the refugee problem, but also requested that they inform the Secretary-General at the end of six months on the fulfilment of these recommendations.¹⁷

10. The second resolution recommended the repatriation, through the medium of national and international Red Cross organizations, "of Greek children at present away from their homes, when the children, their father or mother, or in his or her absence, their closest relative, express a wish to that effect".¹⁸ This resolution originated from the anxiety expressed by the Special Committee in its report concerning the removal of a large number of Greek children from Greece to other countries, a fact which is considered a serious obstacle to the re-establishment of good neighbourly relations between Greece and her northern neighbours.¹⁹

¹² *Ibid.*, res. 193 (III) A, par. 9.

¹³ See annex 3 for a brief survey of the Special Committee's organization of the observation group system.

¹⁴ Annex 1, res. 109 (II) and 193 (III) A, par. 10.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, res. 109 (II) and 193 (III) A.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, res. 193 (III) A, par. 10.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, B; see also A/C.1/358/Corr. 1. The reports submitted by the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia to the Secretary-General have been reproduced as A/AC.16/737, A/AC.16/780, A/AC.16/741 and A/AC.16/758 respectively.

¹⁸ Annex 1, res. 193 (III) C.

¹⁹ A/574, pars. 121-122.

B. ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

11. The Special Committee's work has now continued without interruption since November 1947. During that period the Special Committee has consisted of representatives of Australia, Brazil, China, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

12. The Special Committee regrets that the Governments of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have not, as yet, appointed representatives to the seats held open for them. On 11 January 1949, the Special Committee requested the Secretary-General to invite the attention of those Governments to the fact that, since the Special Committee had been continued in being with the functions conferred on it by resolution 109 (II), seats were still held open for their representatives, and expressed its hope that those Governments would see fit to participate in the work of the Special Committee.²⁰

13. On 2 February 1949, the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General that the attitude of his Government on this question had already been stated by its representative to the General Assembly.²¹ No response from the Government of Poland was received. At the first part of the third regular session of the General Assembly in Paris, both Governments had repeated their point of view of the previous year that the Special Committee was "illegal".²² However, copies of all Special Committee documents have been transmitted regularly to the two Governments.²³

14. In order to fulfil its two functions of conciliation and observation, the Special Committee established two Sub-Committees, the first to deal with the work of the observation groups,²⁴ the second to handle political questions.²⁵

15. Before drafting the present report, the Special Committee decided to make a detailed inspection of the frontier areas.²⁶ Accordingly, in May 1949, three *ad hoc* committees, each composed of three delegations, toured the frontier areas of Greece facing Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria respectively, and presented preliminary surveys at a meeting of the Special Committee held on 23 May 1949 in Salonika, the headquarters of the

²⁰ A/AC.16/W.78; A/AC.16/SR.133, pp. 5-6; see par. 9 of res. 109 (II).

²¹ A/AC.16/597; see A/AC.16/SC.1/Min.43.

²² See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, Plenary Meetings*, pp. 94-95 and p. 121.

²³ In addition, the Special Committee has provided the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia with all unrestricted documents.

²⁴ For details of the observation group system, see annex 3.

²⁵ A/AC.16/555; A/AC.16/SR.134.

²⁶ A/AC.16/SC.1/62; A/AC.16/SC.1/Min.62.

Special Committee's observation group system.²⁷ In addition, individual members of various delegations have made frequent visits to Salonika and observation group bases.

16. On 13 April 1949, the Special Committee informed the Secretary-General that it had decided, for political and conciliatory reasons and in accordance with established precedent, to draft its report outside the territory of any interested party. The Special Committee considered that under paragraph 11 of its terms of reference it had authority to decide where best it could perform its task and accordingly, under paragraph 13, requested the Secretary-General to provide the necessary facilities.²⁸ On 3 May 1949, the Secretary-General replied regretting that he could not accede to the Committee's wishes and citing the mandatory language of resolution 231 (III) of the General Assembly which made it impossible except for the most compelling reasons to authorize travel of any United Nations organ away from its regular headquarters.²⁹

17. Consequently, the Special Committee remained in Athens, while making all reservations as regards the reasons for and the consequences of the attitude taken by the Secretary-General.³⁰

Chapter II. Conciliatory Role of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans

A. ATTITUDES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF ALBANIA, BULGARIA, GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA TOWARDS THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. Introduction

18. The Special Committee has always recognized the primary importance of its function of conciliation.

19. Although the failure of the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to recognize the Special Committee in 1948³¹ prevented its assisting these countries to co-operate with Greece in settling their dispute by peaceful means³², the General Assembly resolution of 27 November 1948, adopted by 47 votes to 6, again called upon Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to co-operate, and upon Greece to continue to co-operate, with the Committee in carrying out its functions.³³

²⁷ A/AC.16/SR.157; A/AC.16/711.

²⁸ Annex 1, res. 193 (III) A; A/AC.16/649; A/AC.16/650; A/AC.16/SR.149; A/AC.16/SR.150.

²⁹ A/AC.16/681.

³⁰ A/AC.16/SR.154.

³¹ The same attitude was maintained in the General Assembly debates leading up to the adoption of the resolutions of 27 November 1948. See especially *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee*, pp. 294-301 and 329-337; *Plenary Meetings*, pp. 104 and 318-325, for the attitudes of Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia respectively.

³² See A/574, pars. 28-39 and 63; A/644, par. 67.

³³ Annex 1, res. 193 (III) A, par. 8.

2. Efforts of the Special Committee to obtain the co-operation of the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia

20. On 20 December 1948, at its first public meeting after the adjournment of the General Assembly in Paris, the Special Committee received an assurance from the Greek liaison representative of his Government's continued wholehearted co-operation.³⁴ The Greek Liaison Service has made a representative continuously available to the Special Committee and has provided liaison officers for its observation groups. The Greek Government's co-operative spirit has been generally manifest.

21. Aware of the urgent need of similar co-operation from the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to enable it to fulfil its task, the Special Committee, on 17 January 1949, earnestly requested the co-operation of those Governments and expressed the hope that they would attach representatives to the Special Committee in the capacity of liaison officers.³⁵

22. No co-operation was received by the Special Committee from Albania, Bulgaria or Yugoslavia. No liaison officers were made available. Only the Government of Bulgaria replied.³⁶

3. The Special Committee's efforts to obtain co-operation regarding specific incidents

23. In spite of the refusal of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to recognize the Special Committee as a legitimate organ of the United Nations, the Special Committee hoped to find an opportunity for conciliation in a narrower field in connexion with some of the many complaints received by the Secretary-General from those countries of border violations alleged to have been committed by Greek Government forces.³⁷

24. All such allegations were immediately forwarded to the appropriate observation group for investigation. On one occasion, for example, United Nations observers examined, so far as they were able within Greek territory, a typical series of Bulgarian allegations that Greek troops had fired into, and mortar bombs had fallen on, Bul-

³⁴ A/AC.16/SR.131, p. 2.

³⁵ A/AC.16/556/rev. 1; A/AC.16/SR.134. The desirability of this had become still more apparent to the Special Committee as a result of criticism leveled at its work during the debates of the third session of the General Assembly in Paris, much of which might have been avoided if all the Governments concerned had attached liaison officers to the Special Committee.

³⁶ In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 26 February 1949 (A/AC.16/612). A clear expression of the non-cooperative attitude of the Governments of Albania and Yugoslavia may, however, be found in their reports to the Secretary-General regarding res. 193 (III) B, A/AC.16/737 and A/AC.16/758 respectively. See also A/AC.16/566 for another expression of Yugoslav views.

³⁷ For a complete list and brief analysis of alleged border violations of Greek territory by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and of Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav territories by Greece, brought to the attention of the Special Committee between October 1948 and June 1949, see A/AC.16/W.91 and ch. III, pars. 57-58 below.

garian territory and that a Bulgarian frontier guard had been wounded by fire from Greek territory.³⁸ Two of these incidents had been the subjects of unsuccessful meetings between Bulgarian and Greek officers which had produced recrimination on both sides.

25. The Special Committee accepted the observers' recommendation that a meeting be held, in the presence of observers, between Bulgarian and Greek frontier authorities in order to clarify the facts. However, its proposal to the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs for such a meeting brought no result.³⁹ On numerous other occasions observation groups attempted in vain to attend meetings held between Greek and Bulgarian and between Greek and Yugoslav frontier authorities concerning alleged frontier violations. Nevertheless, the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia continued to submit to the Secretary-General complaints of violations of their borders by Greece.

B. EFFORTS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO ASSIST THE FOUR GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S RECOMMENDATIONS

1. *The problem of normal diplomatic and good neighbourly relations between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other*

(a) Effect of the Conciliation Committee on the work of the Special Committee

26. During the first part of the third regular session of the General Assembly the First Committee attempted to establish direct contact between the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia. To this end the First Committee, on 10 November 1948, unanimously approved a resolution asking the President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General and the Chairman and Rapporteur of the First Committee to act in the capacity of conciliators jointly and "to explore", at meetings in Paris with the representatives of the four Governments concerned, "the possibilities of reaching agreement amongst themselves as to the methods and procedure to be adopted with a view to resolving present differences between them".⁴⁰ The Conciliation Commit-

tee⁴¹ continued its efforts during the second part of the session of the General Assembly at Lake Success in April 1949.

27. In order to avoid prejudicing the efforts of the Conciliation Committee, the Special Committee suspended its conciliatory role.⁴² For similar reasons, the Special Committee did not exercise its discretion under paragraph 10 (c) of resolution 193 (III) A⁴³ of the General Assembly to appoint and utilize the good offices of one or more individuals since, in its view, the Conciliation Committee was in fact exercising such functions.

28. On 19 May 1949, when the close of the third regular session of the General Assembly had terminated the Conciliation Committee, the Chairman announced that, subject to one point only, full accord had been reached at Paris in December 1948 on a draft agreement establishing procedures for resolving the differences between Greece and her three northern neighbours:

"Full accord was reached for the renewal of diplomatic relations, for the revision or making of frontier conventions in order to prevent frontier incidents and for the establishment of joint frontier commissions to act as conciliatory bodies in the event of disputes arising from incidents at the border."⁴⁴

29. The one point of disagreement had been "the demand by Albania that Greece should formally (*de jure*) recognize the existing boundaries between the two countries as definitive. This specific demand⁴⁵ was not acceded to by the Greek Government". Consequently, the draft agreement had been amended at New York to make it "reasonably plain that there would be an acceptance by both Albania and Greece of the existing boundaries".⁴⁶

30. The President of the General Assembly pointed out that, although the Greek Government

⁴¹ The Conciliation Committee consisted of its chairman, Mr. Evatt (Australia), President of the General Assembly; Trygve Lie, Secretary-General; Paul-Henri Spaak (in Paris); Fernand van Langenhove (in New York) both of Belgium and Chairman of the First Committee at the first and second parts of the session respectively and Selim Sarper (Turkey), rapporteur of that Committee.

⁴² For Special Committee consideration of its conciliatory role in connexion with the work of the Conciliatory Committee, see the following: A/AC.16/SR.129, p. 1; A/AC.16/SR.130, pp. 1-4; A/AC.16/SR.131, pp. 1-2; A/AC.16/SR.136, p. 1; also A/AC.16/SC.2/Min. 39, pp. 2-3; Min. 44, pp. 6-7; A/AC.16/SC.2/PV.44, pp. 4-8; A/AC.16/SC.2/PV.45, pp. 2-4. The Special Committee requested information concerning the work of the Conciliation Committee on 13 May 1949; see A/AC.16/SR.156, p. 5; A/AC.16/690. See also A/AC.16/SR.137, A/AC.16/SC.2/Min. 40, A/AC.16/563, A/AC.16/565.

⁴³ See annex 1.

⁴⁴ See annex 5 for texts of the chairman's statement and the draft agreement.

⁴⁵ Involving for Greece, renunciation of her claim to Northern Epirus. For fuller discussion of the Northern Epirus problem, see pars. 39 and 47 below.

⁴⁶ See annex 5.

³⁸ See A/AC.16/483; A/AC.16/484; A/AC.16/510; A/AC.16/530; A/AC.16/543; A/AC.16/562 and A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/15, OG.4/7, annex B, and OG.4/17/S-1; OG.4/18.

³⁹ A/AC.16/557; A/AC.16/SR.135; A/AC.16/SC.1/Min.88, p. 7. See also A/574, pars. 40-51; A/644, pars. 7-10; A/692, pars. 4 and 10, for examples of similar unsuccessful efforts by the Special Committee to secure cooperation from Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in 1948.

⁴⁰ A/C.1/380.

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had accepted the new formula in substance,⁴⁷ there had been, in spite of ample time, no reply from Albania, upon whose acceptance depended, in his opinion, that of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. He concluded by declaring that having regard to "the very close approximation to full agreement which has already been reached, an early attempt to complete its (the Conciliation Committee's) work might well be successful".⁴⁸

31. The Special Committee, resuming its active conciliatory role, on 27 May 1949 addressed communications to the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, as well as Greece, calling their attention in particular to "the recommendations contained in the General Assembly's resolution of 21 October 1947, which were renewed in two of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on 27 November 1948, for the establishment of normal diplomatic relations and the renewal of conventions for the settlement of frontier questions or the conclusion of new ones between the Government of Greece and the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, as well as the settlement of the question of refugees".⁴⁹ The letters also referred to the statement of the President of the General Assembly, dated 19 May 1949, that the Governments of those countries had under consideration the draft agreement prepared by the Conciliation Committee. The Special Committee reminded them that its good offices continued to be available to assist in the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly. Copies of the letters were sent to the Governments of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

32. The Government of Greece has replied, referring to its report to the Secretary-General concerning resolution 193 (III) B for an explanation of its point of view.⁵⁰ While the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have not replied directly, their reports to the Secretary-General in June and July 1949 do constitute, in effect, indirect replies to the Special Committee.⁵¹

33. Since the Government of Albania had not yet made any statement on the draft agreement submitted by the Conciliation Committee, the Special Committee on 19 July 1949 requested the Secretary-General to inquire by any means he considered appropriate what reply the Government of Albania intended to make.⁵²

(b) Some general factors in the problem

34. Although the Special Committee appreciated that the function of the Conciliation Com-

mittee had been confined to studying "possibilities for an agreement between the four Governments concerned on the methods and the procedure to be pursued for solving their present differences",⁵³ it studied with care the draft agreement and official statements of the Governments in the hope of finding indications that some of the basic obstacles to good neighbourly relations had been removed in the course of the numerous meetings of the Conciliation Committee.⁵⁴

35. In its report of 30 June 1948 to the General Assembly, the Special Committee noted certain basic issues between Greece and her three northern neighbours, many of which have been of long duration.⁵⁵ More recently, it has taken note of certain recent developments in the Macedonian question. Radio broadcasts, newspapers and statements of public officials in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have continued to support conflicting claims for the detachment of "Greek" or "Aegean" Macedonia from Greece and for the establishment of a unified Macedonia in some form or another.⁵⁶ The Special Committee also noted the statement of the Slavo-Macedonian National Liberation Front (NOF) of 3 February 1949, favouring the "union of Macedonia" as an "independent and equal Macedonian State" within "the confederation of democratic Balkan peoples".⁵⁷

36. The radio, Press and public statements of officials of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have remained generally hostile towards the Government of Greece. If the Greek Press has not in return been as restrained as genuine goodwill would have indicated, the assistance from Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, especially Albania and Bulgaria, to the guerrillas in fighting against the Greek Government has hardly been calculated to foster goodwill.⁵⁸ The mutually unfriendly Press constitutes one of the factors militating against the resumption of good neighbourly relations.

(c) Attitude of the Government of Greece

37. On several occasions during 1949 the Gov-

⁴⁷ A/C.1/380.

⁴⁸ The Special Committee, in its 1948 reports, called attention to the gravity of the situation: A/574, pars. 63-65; A/644, pars. 7-8.

⁴⁹ For a brief survey, see A/574, pars. 66-68, 80-81.

⁵⁰ The United Nations Commission of Investigation concerning Greek Frontier Incidents was unable to clarify the attitude of the Governments of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as to the problem of a "unified Macedonia" during March-April 1947. See S/AC.4/PV.70, pp. 1-10; S/AC.4/146, S/AC.4/174, S/AC.4/175, S/AC.4/192, S/AC.4/194. For recent statements see that of Premier Dimitrov, 18 December 1948, IV, *Free Bulgaria*, 1 (1 January 1949), pp. 3-11, part VI, and *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*, No. 28 (1 January 1949); Vice-Premier Moshe Pijade, *Borba*, 6 March 1949; Premier Lazar Kulishevsky, 10 April 1949, A/AC.16/662, annex 1, pp. 1-4; V. Poptomov, "Political Provocateurs," *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*, No. 12 (39), 15 June 1949.

⁵¹ On 28 March 1949, the Second NOF Congress reaffirmed the "right" of the "Slavo-Macedonian" people of Greek Macedonia to decide as to their state existence.

⁵² See A/AC.16/W.90; A/AC.16/W.92.

⁴⁷ See annex 5 for text of statement and draft agreement. See also par. 39 below.

⁴⁸ See annex 5.

⁴⁹ A/AC.16/716 and annexes A-E; A/AC.16/SR. 158, pp. 1-2; A/AC.16/712.

⁵⁰ A/AC.16/741. See reports of the Government of Greece to the Secretary-General, A/AC.16/618 and A/AC.16/722.

⁵¹ See A/AC.16/737; A/AC.16/758 and A/AC.16/780 respectively.

⁵² A/AC.16/SR. 165; see also par. 30 above.

ernment of Greece has stated its willingness to resume diplomatic relations with Albania and Bulgaria and its "readiness for the re-establishment of normal relations with its northern neighbours".⁵⁹ It has also said that "Greece has . . . attempted to settle all differences with her neighbours in the spirit of the Charter and of the resolution of the General Assembly, asking only that they (the northern neighbours) make a similar effort and display a similar goodwill".⁶⁰

38. The essential condition, in the Greek Government's opinion, for resumption of normal relations with Albania still remains the cessation of aid to Greek guerrillas from Albania,⁶¹ and observance of the obligation under international law to disarm guerrillas seeking refuge in Albania and to take the necessary measures to prevent such refugees from resuming guerrilla activities in Greece.⁶²

39. The Greek Government also maintains its claim to Northern Epirus. However, it has stated that the settlement of the claim rests with the Council of Foreign Ministers and that Greece does not seek to alter her frontiers "contrary to the principles and aims of the United Nations Charter". The Greek Foreign Minister, in December 1948, declared that "Greece's lawful claims to her rights do not prevent the restoration of peaceful neighbourly relations with Albania, as this claim had not prevented such relations in the past".⁶³ Acceptance by the Greek Government of the final draft agreement with only one slight change⁶⁴ appeared to the Chairman of the Conciliation Committee to show a conciliatory spirit and offer prospects of settling the boundary dispute.⁶⁵

40. The Special Committee's earlier reports have recorded the willingness of the Government of Greece, officially expressed in 1948, to resume diplomatic relations with the Government of Bul-

garia.⁶⁶ The Government of Greece, however, has demanded that the Government of Bulgaria should:

- (i) "Ensure that the Greek guerrillas receive no assistance from Bulgarian territory;
- (ii) "Undertake to carry out the peace treaty of 10 February 1947;
- (iii) "Simultaneously undertake" with the Greek Government "to respect the frontiers established by the peace treaty".⁶⁷

It also demands assurances from the Government of Bulgaria that the Greek children in Bulgaria will be repatriated.⁶⁸

41. The Government of Greece considers that there is no question outstanding between Yugoslavia and Greece that could not be settled amicably.

(d) Attitude of the Government of Albania

42. In August 1948, the Government of Albania stated its willingness to resume diplomatic relations with the Government of Greece on the following conditions:⁶⁹

- (i) The renunciation by Greece of the claim to Northern Epirus;⁷⁰
- (ii) The cessation of Greece's "provocative and aggressive attitude and criminal and lawless acts against the People's Republic of Albania".⁷¹

43. From the time of the first part of the third regular session of the General Assembly in Paris up to 8 May 1949, the Government of Albania has reported "160 acts of armed provocation at the frontier by air, land and sea".⁷² The lack of contact between the Albanian and Greek authorities along the whole length of the frontier has rendered any joint investigation impossible. In addition, the Special Committee, in the absence of any co-operation from Albania, has not been able itself or through its observation groups to investigate these allegations on Albanian territory. Operations by the Greek Army against guerrillas fighting on the frontier and escaping into Albania have in fact occasioned frequent border incidents and

⁶⁹ For a general survey of the relations between Greece and Bulgaria up to 22 October 1948, see A/574, pars. 69-77; A/644, pars. 15-18; A/692, par. 9. Similar statements have been made in 1949 (see A/AC.16/722). Negotiations in 1948 brought no positive result. For the failure of the last *démarche* of the Greek Government before the establishment of the Conciliation Committee, see A/692, par. 9; A/574, par. 72; A/644, par. 17.

⁷⁰ A/644, par. 18.

⁷¹ See ch. IV, pars. 131-136 below and ch. III, pars. 120-123.

⁷² This statement to the Secretary-General is the latest available to the Special Committee (A/644, par. 13).

⁷³ For further discussion of Northern Epirus problem, see pars. 29 and 39 above and 47 below.

⁷⁴ A/644, par. 13. Cf. the Government of Albania's communication to the Secretary-General concerning res. 193 (III) B, A/AC.16/737.

⁷⁵ A/AC.16/737; see A/AC.16/W.91 for a list of alleged border violations of the Albanian-Greek frontier brought to the attention of the Special Committee.

⁵⁹ A/AC.16/722; A/AC.16/618. Similar declarations had been made in 1948 (A/574, par. 70), but in September 1948, the Special Committee had found no evidence of real progress toward better relations. (For a survey of the position up to 22 October 1948, see A/574, pars. 64-81; A/644, pars. 12-19; A/692, pars. 7-10). In fact, it became convinced that the continuation of large-scale assistance to the guerrillas constituted "an insurmountable obstacle to the establishment of good neighbourly relations between Greece and her northern neighbours" (A/644, pars. 62-64).

⁶⁰ Letter dated 11 May 1949 to the Conciliation Committee, A/AC.16/712.

⁶¹ A/644, par. 12. For a general survey of relations between Albania and Greece up to 22 October 1948 see A/574, pars. 64, 67, 79-81; A/644, pars. 12-13; and A/692, pars. 7-8.

⁶² See pars. 44-49 below and compare A/692, par. 30.

⁶³ Press communiqué of the Foreign Minister of Greece, 16 December 1948, *Greek Government Secretariat of State for Press and Information, Daily News Bulletin*, Third Year, No. 743, p. 2.

⁶⁴ See annex 5, text of the draft agreement, par. 4, for this change.

⁶⁵ See also A/AC.16/712. Among concessions made by the Greek Government to find common ground was the elimination of the original draft proposal for neutral chairmen of the proposed mixed frontier commissions.

minor violations of Albanian territory by Greek forces, thus tending to exacerbate frontier relations.

44. In order to minimise such friction, the Special Committee, on 12 August 1948, recommended to the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia the disarmament and internment of Greek guerrillas entering their territories.⁷³ The representative of Albania told the First Committee of the General Assembly on 29 October 1948 that his Government had "never permitted nor would ever permit refugees of Greek nationality to return to Greece with the knowledge of the Albanian Government for the purpose of taking part in the civil war in Greece".⁷⁴ The evidence obtained by the Special Committee has indicated, however, that large numbers of guerrillas have been allowed to return to fight in Greece.⁷⁵

45. The Special Committee cannot accept the view of the Government of Albania, expressed in its report of 7 June 1949 to the Secretary-General concerning resolution 193 (III) B of the General Assembly, "that it has always carefully observed the fulfilment of international obligations" and that the responsibility for the abnormal situation lies with the Government of Greece.⁷⁶ If Albania continues to aid the Greek guerrillas⁷⁷ and to refuse co-operation with it, the Special Committee has little hope of assisting in the establishment of normal diplomatic and good neighbourly relations between the Governments of Albania and Greece.

(e) Attitude of the Government of Bulgaria

46. In its earlier reports the Special Committee has described the conditions upon which the Government of Bulgaria has stated that it would be willing to resume diplomatic relations with the Government of Greece. These conditions are that the Government of Greece should:

(i) Renounce its territorial aims against Bulgaria;

(ii) End the "violations of the Bulgarian frontier and the war-mongering campaign carried on in Greece against the Bulgarian people".⁷⁸

47. In the first place, certain frontier rectifications demanded by the Government of Greece at the close of the Second World War were not made by the Treaty of Peace of 1947 with Bulgaria. Since then, both Bulgaria and Greece have insisted on the necessity of recognizing the frontier existing between them as established by the Treaty, but each Government has disputed the other's willing-

ness to do so.⁷⁹ In addition, the Government of Bulgaria, in its report to the Secretary-General of 28 June 1949 concerning resolution 193 (III) B, introduced a new factor when it ascribed the failure of the Conciliation Committee to the refusal of Greece to recognize the existing Albanian-Greek frontier as final.⁸⁰ The Draft Agreement prepared by the Conciliation Committee and "accepted in substance"⁸¹ by Greece was intended to resolve both boundary questions by providing for simultaneous recognition of existing frontiers. The Special Committee has also noted that propaganda in Bulgaria has continued to support that country's old claim to Western Thrace with its outlet to the Aegean Sea.⁸²

48. Constant friction along parts of the Bulgarian-Greek frontier has resulted in frequent complaints to the Secretary-General by both Bulgaria and Greece of violations of their territory. A sharp increase in Bulgarian complaints coincided with the operations of the Greek Army in April and May 1949 against guerrilla positions in the Angistron-Krasokhori and Ali Butus frontier areas.⁸³ Strong attacks against those positions, near or astride the border, from which escape routes into Bulgaria were open, led to frontier incidents when Greek Army fire fell on Bulgarian territory.⁸⁴

49. The evidence obtained by the Special Committee has in no way supported the statement made by the Bulgarian representative to the First Committee of the General Assembly on 28 October 1948 that the Bulgarian authorities had always disarmed and interned guerrillas entering Bulgarian territory and prevented them from taking political or military action, in the manner recommended by the Special Committee in its resolution of 12 August 1948.⁸⁵ Nor has it indicated any disposition to cease rendering assistance to the guerrillas fighting against the Greek Government.⁸⁶

50. In short, the evidence⁸⁷ does not sustain the Bulgarian Government's view that Greece is "alone responsible for the abnormal situation in the Balkans".⁸⁸ On account of the lack of co-op-

⁷³ See A/AC.16/612; A/AC.16/619; A/AC.16/712; A/AC.16/722; A/AC.16/780.

⁷⁴ A/AC.16/780.

⁷⁵ See annex 5.

⁷⁶ See A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.6/18, witnesses 6/W/129, 130, 131, 133; OG.6/32, 6/W/243, concerning the existence in Bulgaria of a Government sponsored "Thrace Organization," composed of Bulgarians who emigrated from Greek or Turkish Thrace, whose purpose is to unite all Thrace under the Bulgarian flag. Also see A/574, par. 67.

⁷⁷ See A/AC.16/W.91.

⁷⁸ See ch. III, par. 92 below. The one instance in which an observation group saw Greek Army units move 1,000 metres into Bulgaria in pursuit of fighting guerrillas was, curiously, not the subject of a Bulgarian complaint.

⁷⁹ A/C.1/SR.175, p. 11. For a similar recent assertion by the Bulgarian Government, see its communication to the Secretary-General of 13 July 1949, A/AC.16/787.

⁸⁰ See ch. III, par. 102 below.

⁸¹ See also ch. III, pars. 91-102 below.

⁸² A/AC.16/612.

eration by Bulgaria, the Special Committee has not been able to assist Bulgaria and Greece to re-establish diplomatic relations. It considers that their resumption would not be sufficient to normalize existing relations so long as Bulgaria continues to aid the Greek guerrillas.

(f) Attitude of the Government of Yugoslavia

51. The Special Committee has been unable so far to assist in developing the official diplomatic relations between Greece and Yugoslavia into "good neighbourly" relations.⁸⁹ There have been recently, however, some signs of possible improvement in the relations between the two countries.

52. Although hostile statements by public officials of Yugoslavia have continued up to this date, as well as mutual charges of frontier provocations by Greece and Yugoslavia, the Special Committee has received during 1949 less evidence of assistance by Yugoslavia to the Greek guerrillas. Since a close connexion has existed between aid to the Greek guerrillas and the incidents of alleged frontier violations resulting from Greek Army operations against guerrillas close to the border, the Special Committee looks forward to a diminution, or possibly the cessation, of frontier incidents, especially in view of the announced closing of the Greek-Yugoslav border on 10 July 1949.⁹⁰ Again, the transfer of the "Free Greece" radio station from Yugoslavia to Romania has removed a serious ground for complaint and offers further hope for improved relations between Greece and Yugoslavia.⁹¹

2. Problem of Frontier Conventions⁹²

53. Previously operative frontier conventions regulating border incidents between Greece and her three northern neighbours⁹³ in the inter-war period have been rendered ineffective by the present disturbed conditions.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, meetings concerning frontier incidents have been held on occasion in 1948 and 1949 between the frontier authorities of Greece and those of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. There has been, however, a complete absence of frontier relations between Albania and Greece.

⁸⁹ For the Special Committee's opinion on those relations in 1948, see A/574, par. 78; see also par. 66.

⁹⁰ See A/AC.16/771, extract from speech of Marshal Tito at Pola on 10 July 1949.

⁹¹ In its first report to the General Assembly, the Special Committee found that the "Free Greece" radio was located in Yugoslavia (A/574, par. 116). For report on present location in Romania, see A/AC.16/772 and ch. III, par. 105 below.

⁹² See annex 1, res. 109 (II), par. 5 (2) for Special Committee's mandate concerning frontier conventions.

⁹³ Greek-Bulgarian Frontier Convention of 1931 (A/AC.16/114, annex A), Greek-Yugoslav Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1927, annex containing Agreement of Frontier Traffic (A/AC.16/114, annex B) and Greek-Albanian Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1926, Additional Protocol concerning frontier traffic.

⁹⁴ See A/574, pars. 82-86, A/644, pars. 20-22, for views expressed by the Special Committee in previous reports on the problem of frontier conventions.

54. The meeting between Bulgarian and Greek frontier authorities have taken place in spite of disagreement as to whether the Frontier Convention of 1931 is in force.⁹⁵ The Bulgarian frontier authorities have always refused permission to the United Nations observation groups to attend such meetings.⁹⁶

55. Although diplomatic relations exist between Greece and Yugoslavia, meetings have not regularly taken place even concerning serious frontier incidents.⁹⁷ Sometimes strong charges have been made by both sides without any joint investigation or meeting taking place on the spot.⁹⁸ The more usual practice has been to employ diplomatic channels. However, at four points along the Greek-Yugoslav frontier, posts located opposite each other are permanently occupied by both Greek and Yugoslav authorities⁹⁹ and offer opportunities for contact.

Chapter III. External Support of the Greek Guerrilla Movement¹

A. GENERAL

56. All the information obtained by the Special Committee since the date of its last report and its experience during the past eighteen months indicate that Albania and Bulgaria have continued to

⁹⁵ The Greek Government considers the convention in force; the Bulgarian Government does not. The latter also considers the convention no longer answers existing needs but has stated its willingness to negotiate a new one (A/574, par. 83 and A/692, par. 11; A/AC.16/246, A/AC.16/722; see also terms of Conciliation Committee's draft agreement, annex 5).

⁹⁶ Meetings have been frequently difficult to arrange because at only one point on the border are there manned Greek and Bulgarian frontier posts opposite each other. See for example A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.6/26, incident of 10 February 1949, and OG.4/22, OG.4/23 and OG.4/24 concerning vain effort to make contact at Frontier Post No. 128. For example of meetings, see OG.6/24, OG.6/25, OG.6/26, OG.6/27, OG.6/28, OG.6/32. For observation group comment on effectiveness of meetings, see OG.4/30/S-2. For examples of meetings, see OG.6/30 (6/W/175) and A/AC.16/721; OG.3/31 (3/W/252,253) and A/AC.16/698, A/AC.16/717, A/AC.16/720; OG.4/31.

⁹⁷ For examples of meetings, see the important Koutsoubi incident, A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/15/S-1/Concl. and OG.3/16/Concl. and the minor incident of Niki on 28 April 1949 of straying animals, OG.5/14, 5/W/158. For occasions when Greek requests for meetings were refused, see case of alleged border violations at Frontier Post No. 60, A/AC.16/695 and OG.5/10, and at Koula, OG.5/14.

⁹⁸ See incident of Skocivir on 30 May 1949 involving alleged killing of three Yugoslavs by Greek planes (A/AC.16/726, A/AC.16/728, A/AC.16/740 and A/AC.16/758) and contradictory Greek and Yugoslav charges concerning 28 June 1949 Skra incident involving killing of a Greek soldier near the frontier (A/AC.16/753, A/AC.16/758, A/AC.16/776, A/AC.16/777 and OG.3/33). These incidents were referred to in the Yugoslav Government's report to the Secretary-General concerning resolution 193 (III) B (A/AC.16/758).

⁹⁹ Niki, Paraskevi, Evzonol, Doiran.

¹ Attention is called to the maps in annex 6 which show the terrain and all the localities and routes mentioned in this chapter.

assist the Greek guerrilla movement; and, further, that the support given by Albania is vital to the continuance of the Greek guerrilla movement since all the main guerrilla concentrations are found on the Albanian frontier. From the evidence available to it, the Special Committee believes that aid from Yugoslavia has diminished.

1. Charges by Greece against Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and Charges by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia against Greece

57. The main charge made by the Government of Greece against Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was that they, particularly Albania and Bulgaria, were increasing their systematic aid to the Greek guerrillas.² Moreover the Greek liaison representative has continued to submit to the Special Committee communications alleging frontier violations by those countries.

58. The Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, although still refusing to co-operate in any way with the Special Committee, have continued to submit to the Secretary-General communications alleging violations of the frontier by the Greek armed forces. The Secretary-General transmitted these communications to the Special Committee for information.³ They had been given publicity through United Nations channels before the Special Committee itself had had the opportunity to investigate the charges or consider their merits.

2. Nature of the evidence

59. The Special Committee has been seriously handicapped in its task by the refusal of the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to permit it or its observers to enter their territories to investigate charges, and by the fact that the Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav authorities have not availed themselves of the opportunity to present witnesses for interrogation. The result has been to circumscribe the information available to the Special Committee.

60. The Special Committee has obtained information from a variety of sources, especially:

(a) Direct observation carried out by the observation groups and members of the Special Committee;⁴

(b) The testimony of witnesses interrogated by the observation groups or by the Special Committee;

(c) Various objects, such as captured war material, examined by the observation groups and the Special Committee;

² See especially A/AC.16/746; A/AC.16/763; A/AC.16/770.

³ For full details of the communications relating to frontier violations, all of which were referred to the appropriate observation groups by the Special Committee, see A/AC.16/W.91.

⁴ See A/AC.16/711 for reports of the *ad hoc* committees established to conduct surveys of conditions on the northern frontiers of Greece.

(d) The text of numerous official statements, monitored radio broadcasts and newspaper articles.⁵

61. The testimony of 1,105 witnesses is recorded in 101 reports submitted by the observation groups and covering the period 15 October 1948 to 30 June 1949. In the present report, owing to the very large number of witnesses, reference has been made only to representative or especially significant witnesses.

62. Most witnesses have been Greek nationals, but testimony has also been taken from refugees and nationals of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Witnesses have usually been presented by the Greek Liaison Service and many have been previously interrogated by Greek authorities. Of the captured or surrendered guerrillas examined by the Special Committee's observation groups, a number have been under detention pending further investigation by Greek authorities, but very many have been at liberty.

63. In view of the importance of information from witnesses, the Special Committee established a standardized procedure for their interrogation.⁶

64. The Special Committee has taken into account all the circumstances under which the testimony of witnesses has been obtained and is firmly of the opinion that the statements recorded in observation group reports in accordance with the standardized procedure faithfully reproduce the facts as described by the witnesses. Nevertheless, no single statement has been used by the Special Committee as a conclusive basis for any of its findings. The Special Committee has subjected the evidence of witnesses to close analysis and has carefully cross-checked statements made on the same subject by witnesses examined independently of each other. From consideration of the cumulative evidence in the statements of witnesses, from direct observation which corroborates this evidence and from the other types of information referred to in paragraph 60, the Special Committee has been able to reach its conclusions.⁷

3. Acknowledgment by the Greek Guerrillas of Foreign Support

65. It is significant that the leaders of the Greek guerrillas themselves have publicly acknowledged that assistance from outside Greece has been essential to the continuance of their struggle. On 15 November 1948, Mr. Porphyrogennis, "Minister of Justice" in the "Provisional Democratic Government of Greece", wrote in the *Cominform Journal* that "Greek guerrillas were supported by the freedom-loving peoples of the world headed by our great friend and defender, by the land of socialism, the Soviet Union".⁸

⁵ See A/AC.16/W.90; A/AC.16/W.92.

⁶ For the text of this procedure, see annex 4.

⁷ See A/AC.16/SC.1/53/rev.1.

⁸ For a *Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*, Bucharest, No. 22 (25) 15 November 1948; see A/AC.16/W.90, p. 17, par. VI.

66. At a meeting of the "National Movement for Aid to the Greek people" held on 23 December 1948 in Bucharest to celebrate the first anniversary of the "Provisional Democratic Government of Greece", at which members of the Romanian Government were present, Mr. Grozos, member of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party, stated: "The aid given by the democratic peoples to the fight of the Greek people will never be forgotten".⁸

67. The report of the Fifth Plenum of the Greek Communist Party (30 to 31 January 1949), stated:

"All democratic forces of the world whose solidarity is an important factor for our struggle stand at our side . . . In the popular democracies we found great and wholehearted support without which we could not have made progress."⁹

68. Mr. Zachariades, Secretary-General of the Greek Communist Party, told the second congress of the Slav-Macedonian National Liberation Front (NOF), held in "Free Greece" from 25 to 28 March 1949: "All the democratic powers are with us and their moral and material support in our struggle is plain".¹⁰

B. NATURE OF THE SUPPORT

Albania

1. MORAL SUPPORT

69. There have been continuous broadcasts and articles in the Albanian Press in support of the Greek guerrilla movement. The Special Committee has also received information concerning visits by Albanian officials to camps for Greek guerrillas in Albania¹¹ and the continued activities of the "Aid Committees" on behalf of the Greek guerrillas, which have included the compulsory collection of money, food and clothing.¹²

2. MATERIAL ASSISTANCE

(a) Introduction

70. Since the spring of 1949 more than half the guerrilla strength in Greece has been based on the Albanian border in the Vitsi, Grammos and Pogoniani areas. These mountainous regions are not self-sufficient and on the Greek side of the border are devoid of roads from north to south. An important road in Albania, however, runs from Korce to Leskovik, roughly parallel and close to the border, and affords excellent north-south lateral communication. Minor roads and mule tracks

branching from this road make access to these areas from Albania comparatively easy. All the evidence obtained by the Special Committee indicates that the whole strategy of the guerrillas in the Albanian-Greek border area has been based on the unrestricted use of this main lateral road through Albania;¹³ and that, with the use of Albanian trucks and drivers, the guerrillas have been able to bring up supplies from Albania and to bypass Greek Army units.¹⁴ In particular, evidence indicates that, in January 1949, Albania permitted the guerrillas to reconstruct a bridge on the main route from Bilishte into the Vitsi area;¹⁵ and that, on 1 April 1949, sixteen large guns were towed from Albania into Greece along this route.¹⁶ On 13 May 1949, the guerrillas bombarded Florina from Vitsi with more and bigger guns than they had previously used.¹⁷

(b) Tactical use of territory

71. On 1 April 1949, the guerrillas launched a major attack in the Grammos area. Three main groups, all of which came from the Vitsi area, took part. One of the groups did not leave Greek territory. The other two groups, however, estimated at a total of over two thousand strong, entered Albanian territory in the Bilishte area and proceeded southward, for the most part by truck. One group re-entered Greece near Slimnitsa and the other further south at points between Khionadhes and Mt. Kamenik. These two groups, by this use of Albanian territory, were able to attack the flanks of the Greek Army. The movement of these large forces was assisted by Albanian border personnel and, in the opinion of the Special Committee, could have been carried out only with the consent of the Albanian Government.¹⁸

72. United Nations observers and witnesses have repeatedly seen Greek guerrillas passing back and forth across the border with complete freedom and making use of Albanian territory for tactical purposes. In the Mt. Alevitsa area, where guer-

⁸ See map, annex 6. The principal routes between Albania and Greece used by the guerrillas are: A, the main road Korce-Leskovik; B, the main road from Korce via Cerje, thence between Lakes Prespa and Mikra Prespa-Lalimos-Karial-Trigonon, or alternatively across Lake Mikra Prespa to Mikrolimni; C, the main road from Korce via Bilishte to Kroustalopi-Katokhori and Pishodherion, and the branch road from Bilishte to Ayios Dhimitrios and Ieropyli; D, the main link road from Korce via Dardha-Bozhigrad and Bilishte; E, a newly constructed road from Bozhigrad via Qyteze to Videhove and thence across the frontier; F, three mule paths over the Kazahit Pass, the Fushes Pass and the Badra Pass; G, a track over Kruqit Pass-Slimnitsa-Monopilon; H, the road from Argyrokastron leading to the Pogoniani area.

¹³ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/31/S-1 and OG.1/32.

¹⁴ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/32, 2/W/407.

¹⁵ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/32, 2/W/404.

¹⁶ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.5/15.

¹⁷ For evidence regarding this whole operation see A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/31/S-1; OG.1/32, and Special Committee's conclusions thereon.

⁸ A/AC.16/W.90, p. 10.

⁹ A/AC.16/W.90, p. 18; A/AC.16/573.

¹⁰ A/AC.16/645.

¹¹ For a description of a visit to Sukth camp, Albania, during the latter part of December 1948 see A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/34, 1/W/391; OG.2/34, 2/W/420.

¹² A/574, pars. 105, 112 and 113. See especially A/AC.16/654; A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/25, 1/W/314 and 317; OG.1/27, 1/W/326 and 327.

rilla positions straddle the border,¹⁹ United Nations observers saw, on various occasions, an anti-tank gun, mortars, and machine guns firing from Albania into Greece.²⁰ On 6 July 1949, United Nations observers flying over Greek territory in an observation aircraft bearing United Nations markings were fired on from gun positions clearly located in Albania.²¹

(c) Supplies

73. The areas occupied by the guerrilla forces along the Albanian-Greek frontier are for the most part uncultivated and deserted.²² Yet large numbers of guerrillas have been maintained in these areas. The inference that their supplies must have come from Albania is sustained not only by ample evidence from witnesses²³ but also by the results of direct observation by United Nations observers of certain routes leading into Greece. All the routes referred to in paragraph 70 above have been freely and continuously used. The heaviest traffic was on routes leading into the Vitsi area and was, in the opinion of the Special Committee, far in excess of that required to supply the local population on the Albanian side of the border.

74. Observation from the ground of the exact points of crossing the border was impossible because of the terrain. However, on the nights of 13 and 14 April 1949, United Nations observers saw, from Mt. Alevitsa, lights of motor vehicles moving in the Bilishte area of Albania towards Greece.²⁴ On 30 April 1949, the observers saw lights of motor vehicles moving from Albania towards Greece on the Bilishte-Kapestice-Ayios Dhimitrios route.²⁵ Again, on five occasions during the first half of June 1949, the observers saw, from Mt. Flatsata, vehicle lights moving on the Albanian roads leading from Bilishte to Bozhigrad and from Bilishte towards Kroustalopiyi.²⁶ On numerous occasions between 15 and 30 June 1949, observation of similar traffic was made from the ground.²⁷ Finally, on the nights of 26 and 30 June and 6 July 1949, United Nations observers saw, from the air, the lights of truck convoys crossing from Albania into Greece on the Bilishte-Kroustalopiyi road, and established beyond question that guerrillas in the Vitsi area were being maintained from Albania.²⁸

75. Witnesses have described the transfer of supplies to guerrilla units in the border regions and the kind of supplies received by the guerrillas

from Albania, including food, clothing, timber, tools, field and anti-aircraft artillery, mortars, machine guns, rifles, mines and ammunition.²⁹

(d) Return of Greek guerrillas after hospitalization

76. The Special Committee has received abundant evidence that Albania has maintained a highly organized system for the return to Greece of guerrillas after hospitalization.³⁰ A large number of the guerrillas who were captured or who surrendered on Greek territory had been hospitalized in Albania and gave evidence of their experience there.³¹ From that evidence it is clear that the main hospital centre for seriously wounded cases is Korce. Here, in February 1949, a medical board was in operation which certified the fitness of guerrillas for further field service.³² Other hospitals are located at Elbasan³³ and Moskhopolis.³⁴ Special surgery, eye tests and X-ray examinations are provided at Tirana.³⁵

77. Wounded guerrillas evacuated from Greece were usually met and guided away from the frontier zone by Albanian soldiers. They were then transferred to trucks, often driven by uniformed Albanian soldiers, and taken to hospitals. The internal security of these centres was maintained by guerrillas, the external security usually by Albanian soldiers. Guerrillas when recovered were generally sent to the main convalescent depot and rest camp at Sukth. From Sukth the guerrillas, again transported and escorted by Albanian soldiers, were sent back to fight in Greece.³⁶

(e) Camps for guerrillas

78. In addition to hospital and convalescent facilities, Albania maintained large camps for Greeks at Skodra, Sukth and Burrelli, and smaller

¹⁹ See especially A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/26, 1/W/319; OG.1/28, 1/W/328; OG.1/32, 1/W/372; OG.1/33, 1/W/379, 382; OG.1/34, 1/W/394; OG.1/35, 1/W/398, 400; OG.2/24, 2/W/345; OG.2/26, 2/W/361; OG.2/29, 2/W/372; OG.2/30, 2/W/383; OG.2/31, 2/W/393, 400; OG.5/17, 5/W/175 and 176. On 26 May 1949, in the Grammos area, the Greek Army ambushed a guerrilla column, capturing 104 muleloads of military stores. With these stores was a receipt for food which had evidently been made out in Albania. Two witnesses captured at the same time stated that the supplies had been loaded in Albania. (A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/34, 2/W/425, 426).

²⁰ Most of the evidence on which the Special Committee has based its views on this matter has been given by guerrillas who, after treatment outside Greece, have been captured or have surrendered on Greek soil.

²¹ See especially A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/36, 2/W/433, 436, 437; OG.5/17, 5/W/172, 175; OG.1/33, 1/W/380.

²² A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/32, 1/W/373; OG.5/17, 5/W/172; OG.1/33, exhibit 1.

²³ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/35, 1/W/401; OG.2/22, 2/W/315; OG.2/24, 2/W/330; OG.2/33, 2/W/414.

²⁴ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.5/7, 5/W/46; OG.5/10, 5/W/84.

²⁵ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/23, 2/W/328; OG.2/33, 2/W/417; OG.5/8, 5/W/49.

²⁶ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/22, 2/W/318; OG.2/30, 2/W/381 and 383; OG.2/33, 2/W/417; OG.2/36, 2/W/433; OG.5/9, 5/W/64.

¹⁹ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/37-S-2.

²⁰ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/31, OG.2/33 and OG.2/35.

²¹ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/37-S-1.

²² A/AC.16/711, part I.

²³ For evidence relating to 1 to 2 July 1949, see A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/37, 2/W/439.

²⁴ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/31.

²⁵ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/33.

²⁶ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/35.

²⁷ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/36.

²⁸ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/36; OG.2/37; OG.2/37-S-1.

camps at Prens, Elbasan and Fier. The camps, guarded by Albanian gendarmes, were used as transit and training centres for guerrillas, as permanent centres for non-combatants who had been evacuated from Greece, as clearing centres for children en route to other countries, and sometimes as detention camps for Greeks forcibly evacuated from Greece and hostile to the guerrilla cause. The following examples have been taken from the very large number of statements of witnesses giving detailed evidence of this system.

79. The camp at Skodra, a former Italian barracks, was a centre for women, children and civilians and also a military camp for guerrillas. Estimates by witnesses as to the number of people there ran as high as 3,500.³⁷

80. Military training courses were established at the camp at Sukth, beginning with fifty students in November 1948 and increasing to more than 600 by February 1949. One witness stated that this training was given both by Albanian and by guerrilla officers.³⁸

81. At the beginning of March 1949, there were about 1,000 persons at the camp of Burrelli. Mr. Stringos, a member of the "Provisional Democratic Government of Greece" visited this camp at the end of February 1949.³⁹

82. At the camp at Prens there were Greek families, forcibly removed by the guerrillas from the Grammos area, living in a former barracks. Two witnesses who had been in the camp stated that in it there were some 3,000 civilians and wounded guerrillas.⁴⁰ The camp at Elbasan, in a former Italian barracks, is a collecting centre and reinforcement depot.⁴¹ One witness testified that at the camp at Fier, in December 1948, he had seen some 400 Greek children who were being taken in a 30-truck convoy to Czechoslovakia.⁴²

83. It is particularly noteworthy that the numbers in the various Albanian camps decrease just before any major military operation by the Greek guerrillas. For instance, in March 1949, according to testimony, large numbers of guerrillas were transported from various Albanian camps, particularly from Skodra, to the Greek frontier to take part in spring operations.⁴³

(f) Recruitment of guerrillas

84. Evidence was given by a number of witnesses that the Albanian authorities actively assisted the guerrillas to recruit Greeks in Albania.

³⁷ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/32, 1/W/370; OG.2/25, 2/W/354; OG.2/32, 2/W/405; OG.2/36, 2/W/436; OG.5/14, 5/W/140, 152.

³⁸ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/32, 1/W/363; OG.1/33, 1/W/380; OG.1/35, 1/W/402; OG.5/12, 5/W/110; OG.5/16, 5/W/168.

³⁹ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/34, 1/W/394; OG.2/32, 2/W/403; OG.5/14, 5/W/151.

⁴⁰ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.5/12, 5/W/98; OG.5/14, 5/W/127; OG.1/30, 1/W/344.

⁴¹ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.5/17, 5/W/172, 179; OG.2/34, 2/W/420, 424.

⁴² A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/33, 2/W/416; ch. IV, par. 135, footnote 54.

In March 1949 the Albanian police had lists of those who were to be conscripted, and enforced compliance with the order for their recruitment. Recruiting meetings were held, particularly in March and April 1949, in several Albanian towns by guerrilla and Albanian officers. Albanian newspapers carried an order for all Greek refugees, including the Chams, to enroll and fight with the guerrillas. In the region of Delvine the recruiting order applied to men between 15 and 40 years of age and women between 15 and 25 years of age. One witness, a Cham who attempted to avoid conscription, was arrested by the Albanian police, turned over to the guerrillas and taken to Greece where he was trained and armed to fight.⁴⁴

(g) Summary

85. To recapitulate, the Special Committee obtained evidence that Albania has furnished the guerrillas with war materials of great quantity and diversity, has returned guerrillas to fight after hospitalization, has assisted in recruiting Greeks in Albania to swell the guerrilla ranks; has permitted the guerrillas to build in Albania and within sight of Albanian guard posts, positions from which they have fired on Greek troops; has allowed them to use her territory for tactical purposes and, on one occasion, for strategic purposes in a large-scale operation against the Greek Army.⁴⁵

Bulgaria

1. MORAL SUPPORT

86. Bulgaria also has openly proclaimed its encouragement of the guerrilla movement. For instance, on 14 February 1949, *Trud*, the organ of the Bulgarian Workers (communist) Party, wished the Greek guerrillas "still greater success in the struggle for democratic Greece", declaring that "their cause is the cause of all Balkan peoples".⁴⁶

87. At the beginning of March 1949, Mrs. Ziguoleka, member of the Bulgarian Parliament, at the Congress of the Panhellenic Democratic Union of Women, held "somewhere in Free Greece", speaking in the name of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, stated:

"I wish to tell you that we support you and shall continue to support you morally and politically".⁴⁷

88. Again, on 16 March 1949, Mr. Kolarov, Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, publicly declared:

"We must admit the truth of one accusation, namely, that the Bulgarian people desire to see the

⁴⁴ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.5/14, 5/W/121, 137, 138, 140, 145.

⁴⁵ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/29, 1/W/331; OG.1/33, 1/W/377, 383, 385; OG.1/34, 1/W/394, 396; OG.5/14, 5/W/149; OG.5/16, 5/W/166; OG.5/17, 5/W/174, 176, 177; A/AC.16/W89; A/AM.16/715, annex 1.

⁴⁶ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/31/S-1; OG.1/32.

⁴⁷ A/AC.16/W.90, pp. 5-6.

⁴⁸ "Free Greece" Radio, 8 March 1949; Budapest Radio, 9 March 1949, and Bulgarian broadcast, 28 April 1949.

Greek people free and independent. The Bulgarian people are extending moral support to the Greek people for the realization of this goal. . . . If this wish of ours is a sin, we gladly plead guilty".⁴⁸

89. Moreover, on 25 March 1949, according to a witness,⁴⁹ a member of the Bulgarian Government stated to Greeks in the camp at Berkovitsa:

"All the democratic countries are by your side and will sacrifice everything to help you and to send you back victoriously to your homes . . .".⁵⁰

90. "Aid Committees" have continued to work in Bulgaria on behalf of the Greek guerrilla movement. There have been reports as to the sale of stamps and coupons on which were printed pictures of a Greek guerrilla, and such words as "Help for the Greek guerrillas". Propaganda posters were also displayed. Shops were required to give one day's profit and to collect sales taxes, travel taxes were levied on journeys between villages, and collections were made at schools and from house to house. In some cases the collections were alleged to be for Greek refugees. Often the mayors of Bulgarian villages and towns served as chairmen of the "Aid Committees".⁵¹

2. MATERIAL ASSISTANCE

(a) Introduction

91. A large part of the Bulgarian-Greek border runs along the top of mountain ranges which slope gradually into Bulgaria but steeply into Greece. Communications on the Bulgarian side of the frontier are easy, whereas those on the Greek side are difficult. This difference in terrain has been exploited by the guerrillas with the permission and assistance of Bulgaria. The guerrillas have constructed positions on the border and have used Bulgarian territory for passing from one area within Greece to another.

(b) Tactical use of territory

92. In early May 1949, the Greek Army launched an attack against the guerrillas in the Ali Butus area. United Nations observers saw the course of the attack at close range. The Greek Army, as it advanced along the frontier, was pinned down by

fire coming from guerrilla positions within Bulgaria. After suffering casualties, the Greek Army made a flanking move of about 1,000 metres into Bulgaria and neutralized the guerrilla positions. Observers found that the guerrilla positions ran astride the border and then turned into Bulgaria to a depth of 500 meters; that the guerrillas had living quarters within Bulgaria; that they had been supplied with ample munitions including grenades with Bulgarian markings; and that telephone wires ran from the guerrilla positions into Bulgaria.⁵²

93. The testimony of witnesses showed that later in May 1949, a force of some 700 guerrillas crossed and re-crossed the frontier during a march eastwards from the Haidu area to attack Metaxades and after the failure of the attack, withdrew into Bulgarian territory.⁵³ Guerrillas have constantly marched through Bulgarian territory when moving between the Evros and the Belles areas and have often spoken to the Bulgarian frontier guards.⁵⁴ Guerrilla forces have several times withdrawn into Bulgaria under pressure from the Greek Army, with the knowledge of the local Bulgarian authorities.⁵⁵ United Nations observers reported that, on 15 June 1949, they had watched a party of guerrillas withdraw into Bulgaria near a manned Bulgarian frontier post when pressed by the Greek Army.⁵⁶

(c) Supplies

94. All the evidence indicates that large quantities of military stores have been supplied to the guerrillas by Bulgaria and that the forwarding of supplies has been highly organized. Supplies were brought to central depots in the frontier zone within Bulgaria by train and truck. One large depot north of Ali Butus was operated by guerrilla personnel, comprised of one section dealing with small arms and ammunition, a second with food, and a third with artillery and shells.⁵⁷ Another depot supplied the headquarters of a large guerrilla force north of Drama.⁵⁸

95. From such depots, supplies were taken to the border, usually in the charge of Bulgarian soldiers, and turned over to the guerrillas. An effort was made to check the stores in order to prevent those with Bulgarian markings from entering Greece.⁵⁹ The main points of delivery into Greece have been at Krasokhori, in the east Belles region, in Haidu and in the vicinity of Sarpidho-

⁴⁸ IV, *Free Bulgaria*, 7-1 April 1949, pp. 101, 102, A/AC.16/W.90, p. 6. See also A/AC.16/545.

⁴⁹ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/26, annex A, 4/W/294.

⁵⁰ For visits of other Bulgarian officials to camps and for propaganda in support of guerrilla movement, see witnesses 3/W/189, A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/28; 4/W/241, OG.4/23; 4/W/271, OG.4/24; 4/W/348, OG.4/28; 4/W/205, OG.4/19; 5/W/115, OG.5/13; 6/W/174, OG.6/30.

⁵¹ A/AC.16/471; see 4/W/291, A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/25; 4/W/295, OG.4/26; 4/W/314, OG.4/27; 4/W/352, 353, OG.4/28; 6/W/174, OG.6/30; see also Bulgarian radio broadcast 07.00 hours, 28 April 1949.

⁵² A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/27/S-1.

⁵³ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.6/31.

⁵⁴ See especially A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/30, 3/W/221; OG.3/32, 3/W/261; OG.4/18, 4/W/186; OG.4/21, 4/W/215; cf. OG.4/25, 4/W/289; OG.4/26, 4/W/297.

⁵⁵ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/29, 3/W/217; OG.6/29, 6/W/170.

⁵⁶ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/30/S-1.

⁵⁷ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/24, 4/W/271.

⁵⁸ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/25, 3/W/160.

⁵⁹ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/19, 4/W/204.

nia. All along the frontier, however, supplies of food, arms and ammunition have been delivered to the guerrillas at convenient points.⁶⁰

96. For many months the guerrillas maintained one of their main centres of resistance in the Angistron-Krasokhori area, until it was eliminated by operations of the Greek Army in March 1949. The village of Krasokhori is on the border, and there was constant communication between it and the Bulgarian village of Lehovo.⁶¹ Supplies came by train to Marikostenovo, then by truck to Katuntsi, where there was a large storehouse. From here deliveries were made by night to the guerrillas in Krasokhori by convoys of mules with Bulgarian soldiers in charge.⁶² When the guerrillas were firmly in possession of this area, Bulgarian trucks crossed the border into Greece to deliver supplies of arms, ammunition and food to Angistron.⁶³ United Nations observers, on the night of 4 March 1949, saw from Mt. Terbelar truck traffic approaching Angistron from Bulgaria.⁶⁴

97. Members of the Special Committee who visited this area in May 1949 were convinced that supplies could have reached the guerrillas there only from Bulgaria, since the Greek side of the guerrilla perimeter was closely controlled by the Greek Army.⁶⁵

(d) *Return of Greek guerrillas after hospitalization*

98. Many witnesses testified to the existence in Bulgaria of a highly organized system for returning guerrillas to fight after hospitalization. Wounded guerrillas were evacuated from Greece to first aid or clearing stations near the border.⁶⁶ They were then transferred by truck, train, and sometimes by plane, to large hospitals at Sofia⁶⁷ and at Bankia.⁶⁸ Many of them were sent on to hospitals at Sinaia and Bucharest in Romania.

99. Convalescent guerrillas were sent to Berkovitsa,⁶⁹ which was used as a staging camp for returning guerrillas to fight in Greece.⁷⁰ Espe-

⁶⁰ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/32, 3/W/261; OG.4/25, 4/W/-286, 293; OG.4/28, 4/W/351; OG.4/29, 4/W/356; OG.6/31, 6/W/194; OG.6/32, 6/W/240.

⁶¹ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/17; 4/W/175.

⁶² A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/20, 4/W/211.

⁶³ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/22, 4/W/222; OG.4/24, 4/W/-275; OG.3/25, 3/W/160; OG.3/33, 3/W/264.

⁶⁴ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/23.

⁶⁵ A/AC.16/711.

⁶⁶ Nevrokop, A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/30, 3/W/224, 250; Marikostenovo, A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/30, 3/W/231; OG.3/31, 3/W/251; Ortakiol, OG.6/32, 6/W/241; Tchekalarova, OG.4/28, 4/W/350; Rodozem, OG.4/28, 4/W/351; Koli Bardjesme, OG.6/30, 6/W/175; Loftsa, OG.4/20, 4/W/211; Petritsch, OG.3/30, 3/W/223, OG.3/32, 3/W/261.

⁶⁷ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.5/14, 5/W/135.

⁶⁸ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/30, 3/W/224.

⁶⁹ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/35, 2/W/429; OG.3/25, 3/W/160; OG.3/30, 3/W/222.

⁷⁰ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/35, 2/W/429; OG.3/25, 3/W/160; OG.3/27, 3/W/169, 177; OG.3/30, 3/W/235; OG.3/32, 3/W/260; OG.4/22, 4/W/224; OG.4/23, 4/W/256, 266; OG.4/25, 4/W/287; OG.4/27, 4/W/309, 315, 316; OG.5/15, 5/W/159; OG.6/29, 6/W/167; OG.6/11, 6/W/188, 194, 220.

cially noteworthy was the large number of guerrillas who were returned from hospitals in Bulgaria or Romania through Yugoslavia to the Korona salient.⁷¹ Evidence of the participation of the Government of Bulgaria in the movement of guerrillas is found in the highly co-ordinated use of trucks and trains for their transportation.⁷²

(e) *Camps for guerrillas*

100. The Greek guerrillas continue to use the camp at Berkovitsa as the principal centre in Bulgaria for mustering, equipping and training their forces.⁷³ Evidence shows that, in March 1949, there were over 2,000 Greeks there, mostly of military age, as persons over fifty or otherwise unsuitable for military service had been segregated since June 1948 in a camp at Byelogradchick.⁷⁴ The Berkovitsa organization has steadily supplied very considerable reinforcements to the guerrillas in Greece, particularly in the Haidu, Krasokhori and Korona areas. For example, evidence indicates that between mid-March and mid-April 1949 at least 750 guerrillas were returned to Greece from this camp. There is also ample evidence to show that these military movements have been carried out with the knowledge and active assistance of the Bulgarian authorities.⁷⁵

(f) *Recruitment of guerrillas*

101. There is evidence that the Bulgarian authorities have given every assistance in the recruitment of Greeks in Bulgaria for the guerrilla forces. Several groups of Greeks living in the Petritsch-Svetivrats area in Bulgaria were compelled to join the guerrilla ranks between February and April 1949.⁷⁶ Furthermore, many children, some as young as fourteen, previously removed by the Greek guerrillas from Greece to Bulgaria, have been sent as recruits to the guerrilla forces in Greece.⁷⁷

(g) *Summary*

102. To recapitulate, the Special Committee has obtained evidence that Bulgaria has furnished the guerrillas with great quantities of military supplies, allowed them use of its territory for tactical purposes, maintained camps for them and returned

⁷¹ See especially A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/27, 3/W/170, 172, 182; OG.3/28, 3/W/209; and, for Romania, pars. 116-119 below.

⁷² A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/24, 4/W/270, 271; A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/25, 4/W/290.

⁷³ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/27, 4/W/312, 327; OG.4/28, 4/W/-348; OG.5/14, 5/W/135.

⁷⁴ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/30, 3/W/227, 232; OG.3/32, 3/W/-258; OG.4/25, 4/W/294; OG.6/30, 6/W/179; OG.6/31, 6/W/221.

⁷⁵ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/28, 3/W/188; OG.3/30, 3/W/226; OG.4/25, 4/W/284; OG.4/27, 4/W/324, 327; OG.6/31, 6/W/180, 181, 182, 183, 223.

⁷⁶ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/28, 3/W/194; OG.3/29, 3/W/218; OG.4/25, 4/W/295; OG.4/27, 4/W/314, 322.

⁷⁷ See par. 122 below.

them to fight after hospitalization. It has also given assistance in recruitment for the guerrilla forces.

Yugoslavia

1. MORAL SUPPORT

103. There have been many statements in the Yugoslav Press and in radio broadcasts from Yugoslavia indicating moral support of the Greek guerrilla movement. For example, on 20 March 1949, *Borba*, the official organ of the Yugoslav Communist Party, in an article which was also broadcast during the "week of solidarity with the fighting Greek people", stated that "in this country that week will pass in a spirit of solidarity on the part of our people with the struggle of the Greek people who have revolted against the Athens régime and against the monarcho-fascists maintaining power with the aid of foreign intervention and terror".⁷⁵

104. Mr. Kulishevsky, Premier of the People's Republic of Yugoslav Macedonia, stated on 10 April 1949, during the third congress of the Yugoslav Popular Front:

"Our attitude as regards the fight of our people in Aegean Macedonia and the struggle of the Greek people in general has not been changed by the Cominform's decision. Our greatest sympathies are with the heroic Greek people and with the Macedonian people who are still engaged in their fight and they will continue to have our moral support as they have had it until now."⁷⁶

105. The Special Committee has noted, however, a recent change in the situation. On 6 July 1949, the "Free Greece" radio, which had some time before July 1949 been transferred from the vicinity of Belgrade to that of Bucharest,⁸⁰ accused Yugoslavia of permitting tactical use of Yugoslav territory in the Kaimakchalan area by the Greek Army in operations against the Greek guerrillas and, on 7 July 1949 declared that Yugoslavia had ambitions to annex "Aegean" Macedonia to Yugoslavia. On 10 July 1949, Marshal Tito, in an address at Pola, stated that "Democratic Greece" had fallen "into a trap" in making these accusations, and that this "treachery" might have "fatal consequences for the Greek liberation movement". Marshal Tito, at the same time, declared that Yugoslavia must close the Greek-Yugoslav frontier.⁸¹

⁷⁵ A/AC.16/621.

⁷⁶ A/AC.16/662, annex A, pp. 1-4; for other statements of support, see Vice-Premier Moshe Pijade in *Borba*, 6 March 1949, and A/AC.16/596 (Radio Belgrade), 627 (*Borba*) and 724 (*Nova Makedonia*—Yugoslav newspaper) and Radio Belgrade, 29 April 1949, broadcasting in the Romanian language that Yugoslavia "had always defended the just cause of the Greek people and had fully supported it".

⁷⁷ A/AC.16/772, and par. 117 below.

⁸⁰ A/AC.16/771; see also A/AC.16/773 and A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/34/S-1/rev. 1 and S-2.

106. The Special Committee has received little evidence concerning the continued activities after January 1949 of the "Aid Committees" in Yugoslavia mentioned in the Special Committee's report of 1948.⁸²

2. MATERIAL ASSISTANCE

(a) *Introduction*

107. Although the Greek guerrillas have maintained concentrations on the Greek-Yugoslav frontier, the evidence available to the Special Committee indicates that material assistance from Yugoslavia to the Greek guerrillas has diminished.

(b) *Tactical use of territory*

108. There is no evidence that Greek guerrillas have used Yugoslav territory for tactical purposes during important military operations. There is, however, some evidence that, in the course of minor operations in the Florina area, Greek guerrillas made use of Yugoslav territory. On 16 February 1949, a small guerrilla group made a surprise attack from Yugoslav territory against a Greek frontier post.⁸³ Furthermore, on 17 February 1949, United Nations observers saw guerrillas, when hard pressed by the Greek Army, retreat into Yugoslavia.⁸⁴

109. More important, however, was the movement of guerrilla transport and personnel from Bulgaria through southern Yugoslavia into the Vitsi area⁸⁵ and the Korona salient.⁸⁶ Members of the Special Committee who visited the Yugoslav border on 18 May 1949 formed the opinion that the configuration of the land and the disposition of the Greek Army made it impossible for supplies to have reached this salient except through Yugoslavia.⁸⁷

(c) *Supplies*

110. The evidence indicates that three routes have been used for the transport of supplies from Yugoslavia to the guerrillas fighting in Greece. One has been along the east shore of Lake Prespa to Laimos and thence to the Vitsi area, Ayios Germanos and Plati.⁸⁸ Along this route, in the region where the frontiers of Albania, Greece and Yugoslavia meet, supplies coming from Albania, and to a lesser degree from Yugoslavia, have maintained

⁸² A/574, par. 110; see, however, witness 5/W/116, A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.5/13, annex A, p. 3.

⁸³ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.5/10.

⁸⁴ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.5/10; see also witness evidence in OG.5/14 for incident of 22 April 1949, when a group of 12 or 14 guerrillas crossed the frontier into Yugoslavia, well within the visual range of three Yugoslav frontier posts: 5/W/153, 154, OG.5/14, annex B, pp. 28 to 30.

⁸⁵ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/28, 4/W/296; OG.5/16, 5/W/159, 167; OG.3/28, 3/W/209, 212; OG.3/27, 3/W/177.

⁸⁶ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/30, 3/W/221; OG.4/24, 4/W/270.

⁸⁷ A/AC.16/711.

⁸⁸ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/26, 2/W/359; OG.2/31, 2/W/385, 392, 395; OG.5/10, 5/W/78; OG.5/14, 5/W/129.

a considerable guerrilla force in the field in the Vitsi area.⁹⁰

111. The second has been across Kaimakchalan, where mule paths have been used to supply small groups of guerrillas in the western part of the Ardheia plain around Loutraki.⁹⁰ Thirdly, supplies and personnel have moved from the Belles region, in an area where the Bulgarian, Greek and Yugoslav frontiers meet, to Lithoto and Kavalaris, and also round the north shore of Lake Doiran to the Korona salient.⁹¹

112. Before March 1949, supplies of a varied nature apparently sent through Yugoslavia were received by the guerrillas. They included motor vehicles, anti-aircraft guns, machine guns, rifles, mines, ammunition, food, clothing and timber.⁹²

Evidence regarding supplies from Yugoslavia since March 1949 is scanty.⁹³

(d) *Return of Greek guerrillas after hospitalization*

113. The principal hospital centre for Greek guerrillas in Yugoslavia was at Katlanska Banya, near Skoplje,⁹⁴ where the building of a spa furnished important hospital facilities.⁹⁵ During the latter part of 1948 and early in 1949, guerrillas treated at this centre were regularly returned to Greece to fight.⁹⁶ More recently, however, the majority of wounded guerrillas evacuated to Yugoslavia remained there only a short time before being sent to Bulgaria or Roumania.⁹⁷ Very few guerrillas were returned from Yugoslavia directly to Greece after February 1949, although some guerrillas were returned through Yugoslavia after treatment in other countries.⁹⁸

(e) *Camps for guerrillas*

114. There is some evidence to show that up to March 1949 there were movements of guerrillas from Yugoslavia to Greece,⁹⁹ but that there has

⁹⁰ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/22, 4/W/229; OG.5/13, 5/W/115, 119; OG.5/14, 5/W/136.

⁹¹ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/33, 3/W/363.

⁹² A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/27, 3/W/174, 175, 184; OG.3/28, 3/W/191; OG.4/23, 4/W/252; OG.4/24, 4/W/269.

⁹³ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/24, 2/W/341; OG.2/26, 2/W/359; OG.2/27, 2/W/363; OG.2/28, 2/W/364, 365; OG.5/12, 5/W/104; OG.4/22, 4/W/229; OG.3/27, 3/W/171; OG.5/13, 5/W/115; OG.5/14, 5/W/129.

⁹⁴ Except in the area of Korona where up to April 1949 food, clothing and ammunition are reported to have been received (A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.5/16, 5/W/171).

⁹⁵ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/31, 4/W/372.

⁹⁶ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/31, 2/W/384, 393; OG.2/32, 2/W/408; OG.2/35, 2/W/428; OG.3/29, 3/W/219; OG.5/14, 5/W/139.

⁹⁷ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/36, 1/W/403; OG.2/32, 2/W/408; OG.2/35, 2/W/428; OG.5/14, 5/W/136, 157.

⁹⁸ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/35, 2/W/428; OG.3/28, 3/W/213; OG.3/30, 3/W/222; OG.3/31, 3/W/242.

⁹⁹ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/31, 2/W/395, 399; OG.2/35, 2/W/428.

¹⁰⁰ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/31, 2/W/393; OG.3/29, 3/W/219; OG.5/14, 5/W/139; OG.5/10, 5/W/78; OG.2/31, 2/W/385, 392.

been a steady diminution during 1949 in the flow of replacements for the Greek guerrilla forces from camps in Yugoslavia, particularly from Bulkes.

(f) *Summary*

115. To recapitulate, the Special Committee has obtained evidence that aid from Bulgaria to the guerrillas in the Korona salient has passed through Yugoslav territory, along certain fixed routes. During the Special Committee's survey of northern Greece in late May 1949, members who visited the Yugoslav border formed the opinion that aid by Yugoslavia, particularly the use of her territory by Greek guerrillas, had been limited.¹ Evidence received early in July 1949 indicated that the Yugoslav frontier authorities had received instructions to close the frontier.² Since then, attacks on the Yugoslav régime over the "Free Greece" radio, public statements by Yugoslav officials, and in particular the statement by Marshal Tito on 10 July 1949³ that the Yugoslav frontier would be closed, have indicated a situation which the Special Committee is not at present in a position to evaluate.

C. SUPPORT OF THE GREEK GUERRILLA MOVEMENT BY ROMANIA

116. In the light of paragraph 9 on the resolution of the General Assembly of 27 November 1948⁴ which recommended that all Members of the United Nations and all other States "refrain from any action designed to assist directly or through any other government any armed group fighting against the Greek Government", the Special Committee has taken note of certain activities in countries other than the northern neighbours of Greece, particularly Romania, in support of the Greek guerrilla movement.

1. *Location of the "Free Greece" radio station*

117. In its first report to the General Assembly, the Special Committee stated that the "Free Greece" radio station was located in Yugoslavia in the vicinity of Belgrade.⁵ The radio direction finder tests carried out by the Special Committee in July 1949⁶ have conclusively established⁷ that this station is now in Romania in the vicinity of Bucharest. This station continues to incite the Greek people to rebel against the Government of Greece.

¹ A/AC.16/711.

² A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/34/S-2.

³ A/AC.16/771.

⁴ See annex 1, res. 193 (III) A.

⁵ A/574, par. 116.

⁶ A/AC.16/772.

⁷ The radio direction finder tests were conducted under extremely favourable technical conditions which guarantee the accuracy of the results.

2. Other support

118. The evidence obtained by the Special Committee indicates that during the period covered by this report, Romania has supported the Greek guerrilla movement in other ways. Much publicity has been given in Romania to the activities of the "National Committee for Aid to the Greek People". Radio Bucharest has frequently announced details of collections "in aid of the Greek Democratic Army", and witnesses have given evidence of such activities.⁸

119. Furthermore, evidence obtained from many witnesses has indicated that, since November 1948, large numbers of wounded Greek guerrillas have been sent to Romania for treatment in Bucharest, Sinaia, Kasimovo and Moniassa.⁹ These guerrillas have been systematically sent, after treatment, to Berkovitsa and thence back to the guerrilla ranks in Greece. There is also considerable evidence that Greek children previously removed from Greece by the Greek guerrillas have been sent from Romania to Berkovitsa on their way back to Greece, as recruits for the guerrilla forces.¹⁰ A witness¹¹ spoke of supply dumps in Romania and of one in particular located in a forest between Ploesti and Campian, from which weapons captured from the Germans were regularly despatched by rail to the guerrillas.

D. RECRUITMENT OF CHILDREN TO FIGHT WITH THE GREEK GUERRILLAS¹²

120. In March 1949, the Special Committee began to receive reports of the presence of Greek children in the combat units of the guerrillas. These children, who for the most part had been removed from their homes in Greece by the guerrillas in 1948 and taken to Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, allegedly for humanitarian reasons, have been compelled by the guerrillas to return to fight.¹³ Since March 1949, the Special Committee has received overwhelming evidence that the Greek guerrilla movement is utilizing children down to fourteen years of age, both boys and girls, in fighting groups. The following examples have

⁸ See in particular Radio Bucharest on 7, 18, 19 and 20 January and 14 June 1949; A/AC.16/551, A/AC.16/559; witnesses 5/W/51, A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.5/8, annex A, p. 4; 3/W/236, A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/30, annex C, p. 2; A/AC.16/W/90.

⁹ See especially A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/27, 3/W/181; OG.3/28, 3/W/212, 214; OG.3/30, 3/W/225, 229, 230, 233; OG.3/31, 3/W/247; OG.4/24, 4/W/269; OG.4/27, 4/W/345.

¹⁰ See especially A/AC.16/W.88; par. 122 below; A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/25, 2/W/431; OG.3/27, 3/W/172; OG.3/30, 3/W/227, 230; OG.3/32, 3/W/259; OG.4/26, 4/W/294; OG.5/17, 5/W/172.

¹¹ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/30, annex C, 3/W/236.

¹² See ch. IV, pars. 131-136.

¹³ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/36, 2/W/434, 435; OG.4/27, 4/W/325; OG.5/12, 5/W/112.

been taken from the evidence on this subject obtained from witnesses.¹⁴

1. Albania

121. Greek children in Elbasan, in November 1948, received instruction in military drill before being sent to Greece on reaching the age of fifteen.¹⁵ Here in January 1949, the older children of a group of 600, aged from five to seventeen, were being drafted to fighting units, five or ten to a company.¹⁶ A Greek girl of sixteen, who surrendered on 17 April 1949, had been sent back from Albania on 15 March 1949 for military training to Plati in Greece.¹⁷ At the end of March 1949, a general order was issued at Delvine for the conscription of all Greeks over fifteen.¹⁸ On 18 April 1949, the Government of Albania stated that there were no Greek children in Albania.¹⁹

2. Bulgaria

122. Groups of children have repeatedly been assembled at Berkovitsa,²⁰ and sent back from Bulgaria to Greece to train for combat units.²¹ Their arrival at guerrilla centres and at training camps in Greece, at Kallithea, Andartikon, Plati, Dhipotoma and Khloi, has been repeatedly mentioned by witnesses.²² In particular, one boy of fifteen who was wounded and captured on 24 June 1949 described how, when he arrived at the training camp of Kallithea on 23 March 1949, he found about 200 Greek children between the ages of fourteen and fifteen. They spent six weeks doing military training before being sent to military units at Andartikon.²³ Another boy of fifteen who surrendered in April 1949 told how he had been taken from Berkovitsa on 16 April 1949, along with thirty other children, to Khloi for training.²⁴ Another boy of fourteen, forcibly recruited in Greece in February 1949, was taken to Berkovitsa, from where he was conducted in a convoy by Bulgarian soldiers to the Yugoslav border and thence to the Prespa area in Greece. He was wounded and captured on 15 May 1949.²⁵

¹⁴ A/AC.16/W.88 gives a comprehensive summary of evidence up to 15 May 1949.

¹⁵ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/22, 2/W/322; OG.2/30, 2/W/383.

¹⁶ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.5/18, 5/W/192.

¹⁷ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.5/14, 5/W/141.

¹⁸ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/33, 1/W/385. Cf. OG.5/17, 5/W/178.

¹⁹ A/AC.16/678 and ch. IV, par. 135 below.

²⁰ See ch. III C for evidence regarding the return of Greek children to Berkovitsa from Romania.

²¹ See especially A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/35, 2/W/429; OG.3/31, 3/W/247; OG.4/26, 4/W/294; OG.4/27, 4/W/342; OG.4/28, 4/W/347; OG.5/19, 5/W/190; OG.8/30, 6/W/179.

²² A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/31, 2/W/393; OG.2/35, 2/W/432; OG.4/25, 4/W/293; OG.4/26, 4/W/303; OG.5/17, 5/W/173, 174.

²³ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/36, 2/W/435.

²⁴ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.4/27, 4/W/325.

²⁵ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.5/18, 5/W/169.

3. Yugoslavia

123. One witness spoke of children sent to Yugoslavia in 1947 being returned to the Korona salient in October 1948,²⁶ but no other evidence has come to the Committee's attention concerning the return from Yugoslavia of children previously removed from Greece. Yugoslav territory, however, has been used for the passage of children between Albania, Bulgaria and Greece, the last reported instance being in April 1949, when 200 children on their way from Skodra to Berkovitsa crossed Yugoslavia by road.²⁷

Chapter IV. Co-operation of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans With Other International Organizations

A. PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEES

124. Because of the lack of co-operation of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, the Special Committee has still been unable to assist those Governments to settle problems arising from the presence of refugees in those three States.²⁸ The Special Committee studied, however, the problem of the Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav refugees in Greece and recommended that this problem be turned over to a competent agency of the United Nations. It has watched with interest the progress made by the International Refugee Organization in providing for these refugees.²⁹ Liaison has been maintained through the Athens office of Iro, which has kept the Special Committee informed of all important developments.³⁰

125. The latest information makes the Special Committee hopeful that the international refugee problem in Greece is well on the road to solution.³¹ It appears that 1,080 of the Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav refugees in Greece at the time of the Special Committee's arrival in November 1947 have been transferred from Greece to re-settlement camps in Italy (320 Albanians, 283 Bulgarians and 477 Yugoslavs).³² A further 159 cases of Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav refugees are awaiting final action in Greece.³³ Only eighty-

²⁶ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.3/27, 3/W/175.

²⁷ A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.5/18, 5/W/182.

²⁸ See res. 109 (II), pars. 5 (3) and 6 for the Special Committee's mandate. For action of Special Committee in 1948, see A/574, pars. 87 to 97; A/692, par. 12; A/644, pars. 23-24.

²⁹ The Iro informed the Special Committee on 8 July 1948 that it had signed an agreement with the Greek Government to undertake this task (A/644, par. 24).

³⁰ See A/AC.16/W.72, A/AC.16/SR.124, A/AC.16/SR.138, pp. 1-5; A/AC.16/660, A/AC.16/747; A/AC.16/PV.162.

³¹ Letter dated 20 June 1949 from local Athens representative of the Iro, A/AC.16/747 and A/AC.16/PV.162.

³² At the time of its original study, 29 December 1947, the Special Committee had been informed there were 1,236 such refugees in Greece.

³³ The Iro has found 2,212 international refugees, other than the Albanians, Bulgarians and Yugoslavs referred to

eight of the original refugee applicants have been found ineligible for aid by Iro and remain in Greece. However, the international refugee problem in Greece is a continuing one and the International Refugee Organization has received new applicants for aid each month.

B. INTERNAL REFUGEES IN GREECE

126. While carrying out in Greece in 1948 and 1949 the task entrusted to them by the General Assembly, the members of the Special Committee have noted with anxiety the serious social and humanitarian problem created by the number of internal Greek refugees uprooted from their homes, which has increased from approximately 18,600 in January 1947 to nearly a million in January 1949, or approximately one-seventh of the population of Greece.³⁴

127. Representatives in Greece of agencies of the United Nations charged with providing advisory services and material aid to the Greek Government,³⁵ warned the Prime Minister of Greece, in a joint letter in November 1948, of the gravity of the problem, which was of "such magnitude that it was far beyond the scope of programmes which had been planned and far beyond the resources which Greece had itself or had available to it from any other source".³⁶

128. After receiving detailed current information from representatives of these agencies,³⁷ the Special Committee, on 3 March 1949, requested its Principal Secretary to draw the attention of the Secretary-General to the plight of these refugees and the humanitarian problem involved.³⁸ The Secretary-General informed the Principal Secretary, on 4 April 1949, that in his opinion no basis existed at that time for any formal action by the United Nations.³⁹

129. Subsequently, on 13 May 1949, the Special Committee heard further statements on the gravity of the problem from representatives of the United Nations welfare mission and the Greek Red Cross.⁴⁰

above, eligible for aid. They are being processed in a similar manner (A/AC.16/747).

³⁴ See A/AC.16/538, A/AC.16/601, annex; A/AC.16/691 and especially A/AC.16/PV.139, p. 2. The total number of persons who had proved their eligibility and were receiving state aid was, at the end of January 1949, 666,000; on 1 April 1949, 700,000; on 30 June 1949, 560,809 (see par. 130 above). This figure, however, did not represent the full total of refugees.

³⁵ World Health Organization, United Nations Welfare Mission, Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund.

³⁶ A/AC.16/SR.139; A/AC.16/PV.139, p. 4.

³⁷ A/AC.16/SR.139; A/AC.16/PV.139.

³⁸ A/AC.16/601 and annexed memorandum concerning the internal refugee situation in Greece; also A/AC.16/SR.141, pp. 1-2.

³⁹ A/AC.16/685.

⁴⁰ A/AC.16/PV.156; see also A/AC.16/686, A/AC.16/691, A/AC.16/700.

In consequence, it requested the Principal Secretary to submit to the Secretary-General all recent information on the subject.⁴¹ On the basis of this information, the Executive Board of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, on 15 June 1949, decided to send to Greece Mr. Carneiro, Brazilian member of the Board, to conduct an enquiry into the educational and cultural needs of children of refugees and to allocate funds voted by the Board to aid these children. Mr. Carneiro made a statement before the Special Committee on 19 July 1949.

130. On 28 June 1949, the Special Committee, in response to a request from the Secretary-General for its advice, sent a telegram stating that "the plight of the refugees represents a humanitarian problem of such proportions that the Economic and Social Council might appropriately consider a resolution urging the specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to extend all appropriate assistance within the scope of their responsibilities and the limits of their resources".⁴² On 13 July 1949, the Greek Minister of Welfare announced that improved security conditions had permitted the re-settlement of 130,000 refugees. The problems of their physical re-settlement and economic rehabilitation are of serious concern to the Greek Government.

C. GREEK CHILDREN REMOVED FROM GREECE

131. In the course of 1948, some 25,000 Greek children were removed from Greece and retained in the territories of the northern neighbours of Greece and other countries.⁴³ In its resolution 193 (III) C of 27 November 1948, the General Assembly recommended "the return to Greece of Greek children at present away from their homes when the children, their father or mother or, in his or her absence, their closest relative, express a wish to that effect."⁴⁴ All Members of the United Nations and other States, on the territories of which those children were to be found, were invited to take the necessary measures for the implementation of the recommendation. The Secretary-General was instructed to request the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Crescent Societies to organize and ensure liaison with the national Red Cross organizations of the States concerned with a view to adopting measures in the respective countries for implementing the recommendation.

132. In view of this resolution the Special Committee has confined its work to gathering supplementary information from witnesses interrogated by its observation groups concerning the removal of the children and their subsequent living con-

ditions.⁴⁵ At the same time, it has followed with interest the work of the various international and national Red Cross organizations⁴⁶ and has maintained liaison with the Secretary-General.⁴⁷

133. The Special Committee has not yet received information from the International Red Cross indicating that any of the Greek children have been returned through the good offices of that organization.⁴⁸ Petitions, however, for the return of 5,748 children had been submitted by the Greek Red Cross by 5 July 1949.⁴⁹ The latest detailed information received concerning the problem is contained in a report of 3 June 1949 to the Secretary-General from the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies. The report indicates that the Red Cross had not at that date been able to attain its preliminary objective before preparing actual measures for repatriation, namely, that of obtaining lists of the names of the Greek children in camps abroad. Through its representatives, the International Red Cross has investigated the living conditions in some of the camps for these children in Bulgaria,⁵⁰ Czechoslovakia,⁵¹ and Yugoslavia. Conditions in these camps have been found to be satisfactory. The International Red Cross has not, however, received permission to visit all the countries taking care of Greek children away from their homes.⁵²

134. The report also states *inter alia*, that at the end of April 1949, 11,845 Greek children were in eight Yugoslav Red Cross hostels, and that 3,347 were living with their parents or Greek refugee families in Yugoslavia. It added that, between April 1948 and March 1949, the approx-

⁴¹ See, for example, A/AC.16/W.71; A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/23/S-1; A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.2/18 K, annex 3, and other reports *passim*. Also A/AC.16/SC.1/57, annex F, for Special Committee's instructions to its observation groups.

⁴² See especially A/AC.16/SR.131, p. 6; A/AC.16/SR.133, p. 5; A/AC.16/SC.2/Min. 40, pp. 1-4; A/AC.16/606, A/AC.16/607, A/AC.16/686 and A/AC.16/696. See also A/AC.16/PV.156 for discussion with representatives of the Greek Red Cross Society and United Nations agencies in Greece concerning Greek children and Greek refugees.

⁴³ See in particular A/AC.16/625/rev. 1.

⁴⁴ A/836.

⁴⁵ See A/AC.16/623; A/AC.16/625/rev. 1, and information received from the Greek Red Cross, 22 July 1949.

⁴⁶ On 6 April 1949, in a report to the Secretary-General, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies stated that there were then 1,972 Greek children in Bulgaria (A/836, p. 3).

⁴⁷ The number of Greek children in Czechoslovakia is unknown to the Special Committee. The latest official figure is 2,235, given by the League of Red Cross Societies in a letter to the Special Committee dated 24 November 1948 (A/AC.16/514) but see par. 134 above.

⁴⁸ Among those countries is Romania. The latest official figures (24 November 1948) available to the Special Committee show a total of 3,801 Greek children in that country (A/AC.16/514). Since that time additional children have arrived from Albania (see footnote 54 following) and Yugoslavia (see par. 134) while other children have been transferred to Berkovitsa in Bulgaria (see ch. III, par. 122).

⁴⁹ A/AC.16/714.

⁵⁰ A/AC.16/SR.163.

⁵¹ A/574, pars. 117-123; A/692, par. 14; A/AC.16/514.

⁵² See ch. I, par. 10; see also annex 1 for full text of res. 193 (III) C.

imate number of Greek children transferred from Yugoslavia was as follows: to Czechoslovakia, 3,550; to Hungary, 3,050; to Romania, 6,400; and to Poland, 500⁵³; the total being 13,500. The Yugoslav Red Cross has also informed the International Red Cross representatives that since it was in direct contact with the Greek Red Cross the intervention of the International Red Cross was not essential. "Greek parents could apply directly to the Yugoslav Red Cross for the repatriation of the children. The Yugoslav Red Cross was also ready to act upon requests for repatriation already received by the International Red Cross."

135. Moreover, the report notes that the Government of Albania informed the Secretary-General on 18 April 1949 that the question of the repatriation of Greek children no longer concerned Albania, owing to the fact that there were no Greek children in Albania at that time.⁵⁴

136. The transfer of Greek children by Albania, Yugoslavia and Romania⁵⁵ to countries other than Greece appears contrary to the spirit of the resolution unanimously approved by the General Assembly. Implementation of that resolution implied that children would be retained where they were until the question of their return to Greece had been settled.

Chapter V. Conclusions

A. ALBANIA, BULGARIA AND YUGOSLAVIA

137. In compliance with the mandate conferred upon it by the General Assembly, the Special Committee has constantly endeavoured to promote the establishment of normal diplomatic and good neighbourly relations between Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the one hand and Greece on the other. The Special Committee has repeatedly drawn the attention of the interested Governments to the recommendations made by the General Assembly in its resolutions of 21 October 1947 and 27 November 1948. The Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have nevertheless continued to disregard them.

138. The Government of Greece has continued to extend its co-operation to the Special Committee. Despite renewed efforts on the part of the

Special Committee to obtain the co-operation of the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, those Governments have continued to refuse to recognize it in any way.

B. ALBANIA AND BULGARIA

139. Albania and Bulgaria have continued to give moral and material assistance to the Greek guerrilla movement. Albania is the principal source of material assistance.

140. Albania and Bulgaria have directly encouraged and incited the Greek guerrillas in their attempts to overthrow the Greek Government by official declarations in the Press and in radio broadcasts from Government-controlled stations, by visits of officials to the camps for guerrillas and by the continued activities of "Aid Committees", which were established in 1947 and 1948 for the collection of money, food and clothing.

141. Of far greater moment, however, has been the material assistance which Albania and Bulgaria have given to the Greek guerrillas. These countries have provided large quantities of war material and other supplies, thus enabling them to continue fighting. Albania and Bulgaria have allowed them extensive use of their territories to escape from the Greek Army and for other tactical purposes. These countries have also actively assisted the guerrillas in the recruitment of Greeks in their territories. Furthermore, a system has been in operation in their territories for the return of guerrillas to fight in Greece after treatment in hospitals and convalescent centres. Although there can be no objection on humanitarian grounds to the care of sick and wounded guerrillas in those territories, such a system for their return to Greece after hospitalization constitutes a use of those territories "as a base for the preparation or launching of armed action", and is therefore in direct contravention of paragraph 6 of resolution 193 (III) A of the General Assembly.

C. YUGOSLAVIA

142. Yugoslavia continued to give moral and material aid to the guerrillas during the early part of the period covered by the present report. This country allowed the use of its territory for the passage of guerrillas to and from Greece, facilitated the return to Greece of guerrillas after hospitalization, and furnished some supplies of war materials. However, this aid has diminished and may have ceased.

D. GENERAL

143. The Governments which received Greek children removed from Greece have not complied with the General Assembly resolution of 27 November 1948 calling on them to co-operate in the return of the children to their families.

⁵³ On 9 June 1948, the Government of Poland informed the Government of Greece that there were no Greek children in Poland (A/AC.16/296).

⁵⁴ A/AC.16/678. Witnesses before Observation Group 1 on 18 May 1949 stated, however, that 40 children were concentrated at Delvine (southern Albania) on 1 May 1949 awaiting transfer to an unknown destination (A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.1/34, p. 10, 1/W/394, 395). Witnesses have reported children being sent from Albania to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania as late as April 1949 (A/AC.16/SC.1/OG.5/8, 5/W/182, 184, 185 and 2/W/416).

⁵⁵ See ch. III C for details on transfer of children from Romania. Ch. III also summarizes information received by the Special Committee that some children removed from Greece have been compelled to return to Greece to fight in the forces of the Greek guerrillas.

144. In violation of fundamental humanitarian principles, some of these children, both boys and girls, of adolescent age, have been sent back to Greece to fight in the ranks of the guerrillas.

145. The Special Committee has noted during the period under review that, contrary to the resolution of the General Assembly of 27 November 1948, there has been an increase in the support afforded to the guerrillas from certain States not bordering upon Greece, particularly Romania. The existence of a highly co-ordinated system of support is apparent in, for example, the return of guerrillas to Greece after hospitalization in Romania, the transfer from one State to another of Greek children, and the fact that the guerrilla radio station now operates from Romania and not from Yugoslavia.

146. The Special Committee reaffirms the conclusions set forth in its previous reports to the General Assembly and, in particular, the conclusion that the continuance of the present situation

"constitutes a threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece and to peace in the Balkans".

Done at 3 Marasli Street, Athens, in the English and French languages, this second day of August, one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine.

Representative of:

(Signed)

Australia

Brazil

China

France

Mexico

Netherlands

Pakistan

Poland

Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics

United Kingdom

United States of America

The Principal Secretary

SAM L. ATYEO

RANGEL DE CASTRO

WEN YUAN-NINY

EMILE CHARVERLAT

OMAR JOSEFÉ

J. J. A. KEUCHENTUS

ALI HAIDER ABBASI

HORACE SEYMOUR

GERALD A. DREW

RAOUL AGLION

The Conquering March of an Idea

by Ambassador Philip C. Jessup¹

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948, has been much discussed. The proposed convention designed to supplement the declaration is also under debate. The columns of the American Bar Association *Journal* contain numerous contributions to the study of the question. I do not propose further to analyze the text or to defend or attack the drafting.

At this time the American Bar Association is faced with a larger question. The question is whether this association of leaders of the American legal profession will earnestly support or vigorously challenge this world-wide effort to consolidate and to spread our political and legal philosophy of the position of the individual in human society. I reject the possibility of a third alternation of neutrality, benevolent or otherwise. The American Bar can not be indifferent to the outcome of this campaign.

No one would be so utopian as to expect to find a text on any legal subject which would be incapable of improvement through revision by any competent group of lawyers. All legislation, every resolution, every treaty, represents a final compromise. Stylistic and substantive preferences are subordinated or blended in the agreed text. The process of accommodation of views is difficult in a resolutions committee of an association such as this, in the convention of a political party and in a state or federal legislature. It is infinitely more difficult when the process is international. Here differences of language are physical hurdles. Differences of ideas rooted in widely divergent cul-

tures are mountain ranges which must be climbed before the plateau of agreement is reached.

Francis Wellman entitled his book published in 1903 *The Art of Cross-Examination*. He considered it a branch of the art of advocacy. The negotiation of international accommodation is equally an art. It involves tolerance and a degree of national modesty. We are not—and I hope never will be—engaged in the business of ruling the world. It is not true that the fiat of the United States is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. It is true that our system has demonstrated its success, and that success has brought us the opportunity and responsibility for leadership. International leadership is controlled by an innate antitrust law. The sanction of the law is the loss of the confidence of other nations upon which confidence true international leadership depends. Monopolistic practices defeat themselves as the Germans and Japanese have found in our own time, and as others may find to their cost. On the other hand, contributing professional, technical, and managerial skill to an international cooperation pays dividends.

A very large part of international affairs and thus of the process of international accommodation, concerns the relations between legal persons known as states. This is necessarily so. But it is no longer novel for the particular interest of the individual human being to break through the mass of interstate relationships. Jefferson could see the struggle between the colonies and the mother country in terms of individuals as well as of their political groupings. Wilson appealed to the Italian people over the heads of their government. Franklin Roosevelt is a symbol in many countries today because he felt and conveyed an interest in the living man and woman. The Com-

¹ An address delivered before the 72d Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association in St. Louis, Mo., on Sept. 6, 1949, and released to the press on the same date.

munists pervert the process by seeking to subvert governments, alleging an interest in the common man whom they blatantly ignore when they succeed in imposing the power of their small elite governing class.

When the representatives of 51 states met at San Francisco in 1945 to frame a world constitution, they too had a declaration of independence from tyranny as the background for their work. This was the Atlantic Charter incorporated in the United Nations declaration of January 1, 1942. They could not have ignored, if they had wished to do so, the need to provide for a decent respect for the welfare of mankind. Thus the Charter begins with its declaration that "We, the Peoples of the United Nations," (have) "determined to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women . . ." It recites that the peoples have drawn the Charter through the agency of their representatives. These representatives selected the promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as one of the purposes of the United Nations. They charged the General Assembly with the duty of assisting in the realization of these rights and freedoms. They devoted a chapter to international economic and social cooperation and therein made it mandatory that "the United Nations shall promote: . . . universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms . . ." For the achievement of this specific purpose as well as others, all members pledged themselves "to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization . . ." They directed the Economic and Social Council to set up a commission on human rights. Thus, as John Foster Dulles has said, the United Nations was created "not merely to protect State against State, but to protect individuals."

Now in due course of international events we are confronted with the normal task of translating into more definite terms the general principles which the Charter enunciates. No constitutional document operates without the supplement of legislation. It was a pity that some regarded the United Nations Charter as an end and not a beginning, as a finished structure rather than the architectural blueprints. Line upon line, precept upon precept, the Charter is now building its practical reality. In the words of a great American lawyer, the process is "slow as measured by our lives but not slow as measured by the lives of nations."

The present effort to put content into the Charter provisions for human rights takes on a double aspect as we consider it here in the American Bar

Association. There is first the aspect which confronts American lawyers who must ever be concerned to see that the international obligations of the United States are discharged in full good faith. The Charter is a treaty and as such, under the Constitution, part of the supreme law of the land. The provisions of this treaty with respect to human rights are not wholly self-operative. This fact provides us as a country not with an alibi but with an obligation. The obligation is to transform the promise and the hope into reality.

The second aspect which confronts the American lawyer is to contribute the skills of the legal profession to the effective discharge of the national obligation. There is no place in this task for factional interest or for arrogance. We have achieved much in this country in contributing to the philosophy and to the reality of human rights. We do not pretend to have attained perfection.

We recognize in our own legal development the importance of environmental factors. The law of water rights in the Southwest is not used or useful in New England. A zoning ordinance suited to New York City is not applicable to a small town in Iowa. The American system of political parties or even the jury system may have no reality for hundreds of millions of people in Asia.

Yet there is a unity of law. It is a unity which overrides divergencies of substance and procedure. The doctrine of consideration is not a universal nor is our concept of a trust. Yet there are great legal maxims which express general legal truths. We recognize their universality by naturalizing them without anglicizing their labels. So it is that the fundamental writ of habeas corpus itself retains its Latin name as do the equitable rule *sic utere tuo* and the *de minimis* doctrine. So it is that article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice—which forms an integral part of the Charter—can refer to "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."

It is the opportunity of this and succeeding generations of lawyers to extend the range and volume of these general principles of law to the end envisaged by Cicero when:

There will not be one law for Rome and another law for Athens, nor one law today and another tomorrow, but among all peoples and for all time one and the same law will apply.

The Declaration of Human Rights and the proposed convention are steps along this road. The declaration is a standard. By adding it to the Charter we repeat the process by which our Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution. Again we have not reached finality. The convention is the next step—a step which will transmute the general guiding principle into definite legal rule. When we have the rule we shall need machinery for its effective implementation. Neither the principle nor the rule nor the machinery will elim-

inate injustice or assure respect for rights. Our own history and the history of every country teaches us this. The machinery may be abused even as the men and women it is designed to protect may be abused.

We are attacked by the false prophets because individual cases of injustice exist even in this country and are reported in the press. The slurring propaganda seeks to conceal two important truths. The first of these is the fact that injustice in this country is headline news because it is the exception, because it is a striking departure from the general high level of our standards of conduct. The second important truth is that these exceptional cases can be reported because we have a free press which appeals to a highly developed social conscience.

On the other hand in countries shrouded by an iron curtain, or we may well say curtailed by an iron shroud, it is not news that an individual is deprived of life or liberty, is imprisoned and tortured. This is not novel, it is normal to their unhappy way of life. In that way of life the individual is nothing; the state, embodied in a small ruling clique, is everything. Even if an atrocity were news in our sense of the term, it could not be printed in those countries because there is no free press. These denials of the inherent rights of the human being reach the press only when they pierce the veil and reach the free world outside.

If we had already attained a Ciceronian unity of law and a spiritual unity in our philosophical concept of the place of the individual in human society, it could be argued that respect for human rights is not a matter for international concern. The ordinary processes of law enforcement are indeed matters within the domestic jurisdiction. Yet even here international law has long recognized and our government and international tribunals have long asserted that there is a standard of civilized justice. Failure to live up to that standard resulting in injury to an alien individual has long been acknowledged to engage a state's international responsibility to pay damages.

The international society has come more slowly to recognize that what is involved is really a concern for the individual who has been the victim of barbarous treatment. In our traditional international system of interstate relationships we were impelled to confine ourselves largely to the legal fiction that the state was injured through the injury inflicted upon its citizen. But this was a procedural, not a substantive problem. The rule developed in the era of essentially bilateral relations between states and is still law. International law has not yet been fully modernized but it has progressed. We have progressed into a multilateral era. We have learned that interna-

tional organization and international cooperation need not be confined to postage and statistics and weights and measures. The United States not only accepts this concept of international cooperation, it glories in it. We affirm and take pride in our leadership. I repeat it is not the leadership of monopoly or of domination but a participating and shared leadership.

I repeat also that in ratifying the Charter of the United Nations we have pledged ourselves to cooperate in promoting "universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms." In 1945 we were free to choose. We could have chosen to go on down the isolationist path. Thank God we chose instead the upward path of cooperation.

That choice has in a new sense set us free. We are now free to act internationally upon our deep convictions that the welfare of the individual is something we care about not just when that individual is an American citizen but because he is a human being.

The law of the international society is catching up with the conscience of mankind. Four and five decades ago when American hearts were wrung and American sympathies went out to persecuted minorities in other lands, our government was hampered by the restrictive rules of the era. Jurists strove to grapple with the human problem and sought to develop the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. That doctrine failed to prosper not because it was humanitarian but because it was unilateral and unilateralism contained the germs of its own fatal malady.

It is not a new thing in American history that we care and care deeply what happens to human beings throughout the world. What is new is our acceptance, along with that of the great majority of other members of the family of nations, of the principles which give us a legal as well as a moral interest in human happiness.

There is not one shred of juridical support for the argument that we have no legal interest in human rights. There is no factual evidence that we have no concern about them. We as people here do care what happens to other people elsewhere.

Would this Association adopt a resolution reading:

Resolved: That the American Bar Association finds that the people of the United States have no interest in and are indifferent to the suffering of any individual deprived of basic human rights unless such individual is a citizen of the United States.

Would it adopt any resolution which in effect embodied such a false and obnoxious conclusion even though the meaning were cloaked instead of patent? Nor could this Association of lawyers find that there is no legal justification for our evincing our concern in the denial of the basic human rights of any individuals anywhere.

We start then with the premise that we have an actual and a legal interest in the preservation of human rights. Neither the law nor the fact behind that premise can be successfully challenged.

Our problem is then a problem of method. Some hearts may not be stout enough to face the difficulties of international relations in the world as it exists today. I need not describe the basic nature of those difficulties or their source. We all know what they are. The difficulties are not confined to the consideration of a declaration and a covenant of human rights. They beset us throughout the social, economic and political fields. Some may wish to surrender without a fight but that is not the policy of the Government of the United States. It is not the American tradition or the spirit of the American Bar Association.

Some are discouraged by the prospect that treaties will be broken or ignored. Unfortunately they will be. Man is still so imperfect that broken treaties like broken contracts are part of the common phenomena of life. Life goes on because civilization has advanced far enough to provide a legion of law-abiding, promise-respecting states and individuals. We belong to that legion. We shall continue to make treaties and to respect them because we believe in law and not in anarchy. I see no reason to lapse into either barbarism or defeatism because there are still barbarians at large.

A heavy responsibility rests upon us and upon the like-minded peoples of the world. Openly and covertly the dignity and worth of the human person is being assailed. We care about that and we are not ashamed to admit or afraid to proclaim it.

We have an opportunity to participate, to lead in participating in the long process of realizing the aims and aspirations embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Why should we neglect this opportunity because this is the beginning rather than the end? We are working with an idea and ideas take time to mature and bear fruit. Is it not worth while to recapture the spirit of a former president of the American Bar Association who said:

The triumphant march of the conquering hero is admirable and to be greeted with huzzas, but the conquering march of an idea which makes for humanity is more admirable and more to be applauded.

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¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

THE RECORD OF THE WEEK

Ecuador Relief

by Edward G. Miller, Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs.¹

I shall never forget my trip to the stricken area of Ecuador. Like other Americans, when news of the earthquake first reached this country I was shocked. But, in spite of the eyewitness and other accounts of the disaster, the newsreels and the many pictures that our press published, it was impossible for me to visualize conditions as they actually are. I could not comprehend the extent and the completeness of the devastation and the untold misery that was visited in a few hours time on the people of that unfortunate country.

I went to Ecuador in an official capacity, to express personally the sympathy of our government to the government and to the people of our neighbor republic. I have returned to Washington appalled by what I saw and by the tremendous job of reconstruction and rehabilitation that must be done. But I returned inspired, at the same time, by the spirit and the determination of the survivors, the courage with which they are struggling out of the wreckage not only of their cities and towns, their homes, but of their family life as well.

I made an extended tour of the devastated area to survey conditions and bring back a report to our government. After a brief stay in Quito to confer with government officials, my tour began with Ambato, the capital of Tungurahua Province. This was an important industrial center with close to 40 thousand inhabitants. It is 80 percent destroyed. Fortunately, the quake occurred in the early afternoon and the loss of life, though considerable, was proportionately small. After two and a half weeks of toil, however, we saw rescue

parties still digging corpses from the rubble of the beautiful stone cathedral, which was completely razed.

We walked over what once had been the town of Pelileo, located in the center of the earthquake zone. This had been a town of 6 thousand people, the thriving capital of a rich agricultural region. Today one lone wall remains partially standing there and an estimated 4 thousand bodies still lay buried in the ruins. The death toll would have been considerably larger had not a great number of the inhabitants been at their work in the surrounding countryside.

In the area surrounding Pelileo sections of the countryside, including settlements of various sizes, completely disappeared from the face of the earth. As the angle of rest of the sloping land was disturbed by the quake, thousands of acres of the mountainside caved in and settled. Here the loss of life was especially great as there was no escape.

Wherever I went—to the towns of Patate, Pil-laro and Guano—the story was the same—death, destruction and desolation. Tales of individual horror and grief were repeated over and over again. In one locality I saw a child still digging in the ruins looking for his mother. In another, a disconsolate father unwilling to accept the obvious as true, hoping against hope to find his wife and children still among the living.

But if the catastrophe was a horrible thing to contemplate, it served at the same time to renew man's faith in his fellow men, in the principles of democratic government that are cherished in the Americas and in the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere.

For one thing, the government of President Galo Plaza, who was chosen only 14 months ago

¹ An address delivered over the National Broadcasting Company on Sept. 8, 1949, and released to the press on the same date.

in an election that represented the free will of the people, responded in a most courageous manner to the emergency. With sureness and dispatch relief measures were taken and put into effect, reducing considerably the sufferings of the survivors. Like their government, the survivors themselves rose to the occasion with great heart and a display of spirit that is truly an inspiration. The courage of the people and the self-reliance of their government are, to me, striking evidences of the real worth and dignity of the individual human being and of the fundamental strength of democracy.

Another fact that my survey brought forcefully home to me is the compassion that the disaster evoked from Ecuador's sister republics. There was an immediate and generous reaction among them to help the victim nation. If there remain any who question inter-American solidarity and the concepts of interdependence and cooperation which are its rock-bed, let them take note of the swiftness with which response to the emergency came.

The facts are that within a few hours of the disaster virtually every country in the Western Hemisphere was taking measures to come to the immediate assistance of the stricken nation. When I arrived in Ambato we saw Ecuadoran and American doctors and nurses working side by side with a team of nurses from Colombia and a team of doctors from Venezuela. Their joint efforts succeeded in eliminating fears of epidemic from typhus and typhoid.

Response from the family of American nations has not been limited to sending emergency relief supplies and personnel. Several substantial contributions of funds have been made as well. The Government of Venezuela showed the way with a donation of 1 million dollars. The Uruguayan Congress has approved an allocation of 1 million pesos, more than half a million dollars, from its foreign-exchange fund as a gift to Ecuador. Similar gifts have been made or are under consideration by other governments and agencies. Among the latter, the International Children's Emergency Fund of the United Nations proposes to allocate 200 thousand dollars for the specific purpose of taking care of the needs of children. The Council of the Organization of American States has made a gift of 250 thousand dollars to cover the cost of survey of reconstruction problems of the area.

The amounts of contributions from sister republics do not at first glance reflect their magnitude. If we consider that each of the nations to the south is facing domestic problems of its own and devoting as much of its income as possible to economic development, we will get a more accurate appraisal of the sacrifices these nations are making.

I was gratified to see the effects of United States aid to Ecuador. The American Red Cross alone has extended emergency relief amounting to 135 thousand dollars in the form of cash, medical supplies, sanitation equipment, blankets and large supplies of tents for temporary shelter against the rainy season which has already begun.

In addition, the Red Cross sent to Ecuador two of its most experienced disaster relief technicians, Maurice Reddy of Washington, D. C., and H. Edward Russell of St. Louis, who did able and creditable work in organizing and directing relief measures. On my trip to Ecuador I was accompanied by Frank T. Cleverly of Alexandria, Virginia, Administrator for Foreign Operations of the Red Cross.

The United States Department of National Defense, likewise, made an important contribution in the form of air transportation of the supplies it made available to the Red Cross and participation in emergency operations. For the 2 weeks after the quake, a veritable air lift was in operation between the Canal Zone, Quito and Ambato.

United States representatives of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs who were on the scene and other sanitary engineers of that organization sent from Peru and Bolivia contributed measurably to the success of antiepidemic activities and other work in the stricken area. Within 48 hours after the quake for example, a portable water supply system had been installed in Ambato and is in full operation.

Dr. C. Glenn Curtis, of Pasadena, California, chief of the Institute's mission to Ecuador, was designated by President Plaza to be in charge of all medical and antiepidemic activities, testifying to Ecuadoran confidence in Dr. Curtis and in the ability of his mission. Within a few hours of the news of the earthquake, Preston Blanks, formerly of Meridian, Mississippi, was sent to the disaster area by Dr. Curtis along with a group of assistants. They have been hard at work ever since. When I arrived at the town of Ambato I found Mr. Blanks to be the most popular man there.

I cannot let this occasion go by without a mention of the personal devotion of Mrs. Betty Bernbaum of Chicago, the wife of the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States Embassy in Quito, Maurice M. Bernbaum. For 6 days and 6 nights, without let-up, Mrs. Bernbaum operated a portable hand radio transmitting set, relaying to the Canal Zone information about relief supplies that were most urgently needed. Her performance was outstanding, but at the same time typical of the reaction of the entire United States mission to Ecuador.

All in all, immediate relief measures that were taken in Ecuador were spectacular and they have more than amply met the requirements of the situation. Present physical needs are adequately taken care of and other emergency measures to

prevent postdisaster epidemics have been effectively taken. Supplies of food and clothing appear ample.

The basic problem that now confronts the Ecuadorian nation is one of reconstruction, especially in housing. No more than a passing survey of the situation is sufficient to demonstrate that the extent of the disaster is far out of proportion to the capacity of Ecuador to cope with it. Essentially, Ecuador is an agricultural country. It has some manufacturing capacity but much of that in the earthquake region is inoperative now.

In the disaster area more than 100 thousand people are homeless. In various localities from 80 to 100 percent of the housing, schools, churches, hospital facilities, transportation systems and sanitation installations were destroyed. This applies to the rural areas as well as to the cities and towns.

Consider the housing problem alone. In the destroyed area the homes had been handcrafted over hundreds of years. Compare a situation where 80 percent of the living quarters were almost instantly wiped out with our own housing problem in this country.

The Government of Ecuador estimated that on the basis of present national income it would take more than 25 years to bring about adequate restoration. While the emergency has passed, the present situation cannot be allowed to persist. Misery is the prevalent condition. The unemployment problem resulting from destruction of industrial establishments will become more and more serious. Coupled with other aftereffects of the earthquake it threatens to present a dangerous political situation, breeding unrest and discontent.

The Ecuadorian Government looks to us in this country for assistance. We as individuals, as groups, as a nation must do whatever is in our power to help. Our relations with Ecuador have always been close and friendly. When war came in 1941, Ecuador was prompt to join on our side and made an important contribution to the war effort by making available bases on its territory at Salinas and in the Galapagos Islands.

The Export-Import Bank is sending a technical mission to Ecuador to consider extending a loan for reconstruction purposes. Such a loan would be an important contribution to the problem, but we must remember, too, that the Ecuadorian Government is limited in its ability to service foreign loans.

I note with interest, too, that a bill has been introduced in Congress calling for assistance to Ecuador. I am sure that action along this line would be deeply appreciated in that country.

There has also been considerable interest shown in Ecuador by private United States citizens and groups. Some national organizations such as the American Legion have taken cognizance of the situation and passed resolutions urging help.

Others like the National War Relief Service of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the Congress of Industrial Organization, the Free Trade Union Committee of the Labor League for Human Rights of the American Federation of Labor have made substantial donations of funds.

Some private industries have added contributions in the form of foodstuffs and sanitation equipment and services which were transported free of charge by public carriers. Several cities have taken the initiative and launched fund-raising campaigns. Among them are Miami, New Orleans, San Francisco, and New York. In addition numerous private contributions are being made to the Ecuador Relief Fund of the Pan American Union.

I wish to extend to all private contributors the thanks and the appreciation of the Department of State.

I am confident that this report I have given you tonight will spur you as individuals and as organizations to a greater effort. The subsequent turn of events in Ecuador may well depend upon United States generosity. A helping hand to our stricken neighbor will serve the cause of humanity, strengthen the bonds of Western Hemisphere cooperation and help preserve the free institutions that we cherish.

IIAA Program a Major Expression of the Good-Neighbor Policy in Action

[Released to the press September 6]

The United States Government's program of cooperation with other American Republics in the fields of agriculture, education, and health and sanitation through the Institute of Inter-American Affairs is a major expression of the good-neighbor policy in action, Secretary of State Acheson said today.

The Secretary's remark was prompted by President Truman's signing of legislation which extends the active life of the Institute to June 30, 1955. Under previous legislation the Institute would have gone into liquidation in August 1950.

"The achievements of this program since 1942 in improving the quality of elementary and vocational education, in raising the level of basic food production, and in creating more healthful environments for millions of people in Latin America," Secretary Acheson added, "have demonstrated its effectiveness as a means for attaining the objectives of the good-neighbor policy. It is reassuring to know that this work will go forward, not just for one more year but for five additional years."

The Institute of Inter-American Affairs is currently active in 16 Latin American countries and

is conducting a total of 25 work programs in cooperation with the local governments. Four of these programs are in the field of agriculture, 7 in education, and 14 in health and sanitation.

Financial contributions of the United States to these activities, which ran as high as 90 and 95 percent of total project costs in the early days of the program, have recently been overshadowed by the steadily increasing contributions of the cooperating countries. In most cases the share of total project costs now being borne by the cooperating governments runs three and four times as great as the share borne by the United States.

Under previous legislation the Institute was authorized to receive appropriations up to a maximum of 5 million dollars in any one year for its total work. Under the new law signed by President Truman, aggregate expenditures up to a maximum of 35 million dollars are authorized for the 5-year period from July 1, 1950, to June 30, 1955.

This will permit, according to Institute President Dillon S. Myer, continuation of 25 work programs now under way, establishment of new programs in countries where only one or two types of activity are now being carried forward, and extension of the Institute's work to some of the Latin American countries where it is not now in operation.

Announcements on Negotiations for Reciprocal Tariff Concessions

[Released to the press September 6]

The following statements have been released to the press at Annecy, France, where delegations from the United States and 33 other countries have been engaged, since April 11, 1949, in negotiations for reciprocal tariff concessions and for accession of additional countries to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiated at Geneva in 1947.

COMPLETION OF DIRECT BILATERAL TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS

By August 27 the various negotiating teams had completed their direct negotiations at Annecy in accordance with the timetable which the participating countries had laid down in July. The results of these negotiations will now be distributed to the participating governments for evaluation in the light of accomplishments of the conference as

a whole and will be collated and incorporated in the appropriate documents. It is expected that this process will be completed in time for the appropriate documents to be opened for signature at Lake Success in the early part of October. The results of the negotiations will also be made public at that time.

U.S.-COLOMBIAN NEGOTIATIONS UNCOMPLETED

The delegates of Colombia and the United States today issued the following statement at the close of the Annecy tariff negotiations:

The Colombian and United States delegations have jointly notified the Secretariat that, in view of the basic difficulties underlying their Annecy tariff negotiations, as well as their scope and complexity, it was not possible to conclude them and they will therefore remain as "uncompleted negotiations" which both delegations hope may be concluded at a later date. In the circumstances the delegation of Colombia is withdrawing its application to accede to the General Agreement at this time, on the understanding that the Government of Colombia may possibly wish to renew their application to accede at a future date. Tariff concessions agreed upon at Annecy between Colombia and other participating countries will probably remain in suspense. The countries involved are Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, India, Italy, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and Uruguay.

Both delegations are pleased to report that the negotiations between the two countries were carried out at Annecy in a cordial and friendly manner and with a mutual desire to arrive at a satisfactory agreement and regret their inability to carry them to a conclusion.

In view of the special problems which arise from the application of the present commercial agreement between the two countries, in force since 1936, and entered into when economic, monetary, and fiscal conditions were completely different from today, the delegations of both countries have agreed to recommend to their respective countries that the agreement be jointly terminated through normal diplomatic channels.

The United States delegation recognized Colombia's need to make a revision of its customs tariff in order to adjust it to present day conditions, but found that the level of a number of proposed rates of the Colombian tariff was a major obstacle that could not be completely overcome.

The chiefs of the respective negotiating teams believe that the negotiations were fruitful since they afforded an opportunity for making a careful study of the commercial problems and customs duties involved.

U.S. Protests Siege of Consulate General at Shanghai

[Released to the press September 8]

The Department of State announced today that the following letter dated August 22 protesting the siege of the American consulate general at Shanghai by alien former employees of the United States Navy during the period July 29 to August 2 has been sent by Acting American Consul General Walter P. McConaughy in Shanghai to Chang Han-fu, Aliens Affairs Bureau, Shanghai Military Control Commission:

On Friday, July 29, at 7:30 a. m. a group of approximately 30 to 40 workers representing themselves as delegates of the former employees of the United States Navy forced their way into the premises of No. 2 Peking Road, which is owned by the Government of the United States, and announced their intention of remaining in occupancy of the building indefinitely until satisfactory settlement of their demands regarding separation pay and severance bonuses had been agreed upon. Since this action constituted an illegal invasion of United States Government property and was also in contravention of our understanding of point 8 of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's proclamation regarding the protection of foreign property, we protested this action to the Alien Affairs Department of the Shanghai Military Control Commission. Furthermore, since the continued unauthorized presence of crowds varying from 20 to 80 within the premises of the building constituted a continuing threat to the maintenance of law and order, we also protested this potential violation of the peace to the local public safety officials.

Below is set forth a record of the attempts which were made to secure intervention by the proper authorities:

1. At 7:30 a. m., on July 29 the Bureau of Public Security of the Whangpoo police station was informed of the invasion of our premises and the officer on duty indicated that police would be sent over.

2. At 9:35 a. m., on July 29 Mr. Reuben R. Thomas called upon Mr. Feng of your office and informed him of the developments. He called attention to the fact that the dispute between the workers and the United States Navy, in which the representatives of this office were acting merely

as go between, had been fully laid before the Alien Affairs Department in our letter of July 12 and that we had been requested to take no further steps pending advice from your office; and had been assured that no violence would be permitted pending the receipt of such advice. Mr. Feng defended the action of the workers by insisting that, as ex-employees of a former occupant of 2 Peking Road, they had a legitimate right within the premises. Mr. Feng's attention was also called to the fact that invasion of the premises of 2 Peking Road constituted a violation of the most elementary principles of international law and universal practice, since the premises in question were the property of the United States Government and used for official purposes.

3. At approximately 10 o'clock on July 29 a second call to the Whangpoo police station inquiring why police had not arrived was answered by the statement that the police could not intervene in what they termed a labor dispute.

4. At approximately 11 a. m., on July 29, 2 officers from the Whangpoo police station came to the premises and talked with the workers' delegates, but refused to discuss matters with personnel of this office.

5. At approximately 2 p. m., on July 29, the Whangpoo police station was again called and again refused to intervene in what they termed a labor dispute.

6. At approximately 2:30 p. m., the Alien Control Department of the Bureau of Public Security at the Foochow Road central police station was informed of the situation and likewise refused to intervene in what they termed a labor dispute.

7. At approximately 2:30 p. m., on Saturday July 30, a representative of this office delivered to an official of the Alien Affairs Department in its new offices at Broadway Mansions a communication which set forth the urgency and danger of this situation, and was informed that the communication was provisionally accepted although responsible officials were not available at the moment.

8. At approximately 8:30 p. m., on Saturday July 30, when the situation within the premises of 2 Peking Road had become critical due to threats

of violence by the workers, the Whangpoo police station was again informed of this threat to law and order and again refused to intervene.

9. At 11:30 a. m., on Sunday July 31, 2 representatives of this office discussed the matter personally with an official of the Foochow Road police station who contended that the police could not interfere on the grounds that no violence had occurred which he interpreted to mean no one had been subjected to bodily violence or had been threatened with a gun. He finally agreed to send someone to investigate, but reiterated that the police could not interfere in a labor dispute and could only take action in case of violence. To the best of our knowledge no investigator ever appeared.

The final withdrawal of the workers from our premises was not effected until 5:50 p. m., on Tuesday August 2, after they had occupied the building for more than 4½ days. They were apparently persuaded to withdraw as a result of their having at last been made to realize the fact that their continued presence in the building, implying coercion and intimidation, made it impossible for us to refer to Washington, for the Navy Department's consideration, the terms of settlement proposed by the Shanghai General Labor Union mediator at the meeting between representatives of the workers and our office held on the afternoon of August 1. This office has reason to believe that the final persuasion of the workers to withdraw is attributable to the help of your office.

This office has recently also been given to understand that the workers had been cautioned from the beginning against violence; that your office was prepared at all times to have assistance rendered to us had actual bodily violence been inflicted by the workers upon officers of our staff; and that your office took steps to keep informed in regard to developments in the situation from that standpoint. I have welcomed these indications that your office took cognizance of the situation and eventually undertook remedial action.

I must, however, place on record the following points:

(1). As the above chronology of events makes abundantly clear, no effort was spared by this office to bring the developments noted to the attention of the proper authorities, despite which for over 4 days no positive action was taken by the authorities to protect property or to remove the unauthorized occupants from our premises.

(2). As it hardly seems necessary for me to repeat, this office had at all times exercised its good offices within the limit of its role as a go-between to reach an amicable and mutually agreeable solution to the problem. On the other hand, this office had from the very beginning also made it clear that it would not negotiate or discuss such problems under threats of force and intimidation.

(3). In my view, the failure of the local authorities for over 4 days, to take effective action to terminate the illegal occupation of the premises at 2 Peking Road constitutes a serious repudiation of the minimum standards of international law and comity by condoning the invasion of the property of a sovereign state situated within territory purportedly controlled by those authorities.

(4). While prepared to recognize the authorities' reported readiness to stop any actual bodily violence which might be employed by the workers against members of our staff, I must point out that:

(a). Had actual violence been inflicted upon members of our staff by the workers (as easily could have happened in view of their large numbers and high pitch excitement), the harm would have been done before police could have reached the building:

(b). The treatment to which Mr. Thomas was subjected by the workers, involving, as it did, unremitting verbal pressure (including threats) and forcing him to go with very little food and sleep for over 24 hours, brought him to a point of nervous and physical exhaustion which was no less serious than bodily injury, and, in our opinion, is properly to be regarded as a form of violence.

The failure of the authorities to take timely positive steps to insure against violence which might easily have occurred and to rescue Mr. Thomas from the cruel and unusual treatment to which he was actually subject is a further serious breach, not only of international law and comity, but also of universally accepted humanitarian standards.

In reviewing these points for your attention, I must accordingly protest in the gravest terms the failure of the local authorities to fulfill, in the serious respects noted above, obligations towards protection of life and property which are universally recognized under international law and practice, and which, moreover, the authorities themselves have appeared clearly to recognize in publishing specific assurances by Chairman Mao Tze-tung and in other public pronouncements.

Two American Servicemen Missing in China

[Released to the press August 31]

On October 19, 1948, two American servicemen, William C. Smith, Chief Construction Electrician, USN, of Long Beach, California; and Elmer C. Bender, Master Sergeant, USMC, of Cincinnati, Ohio, failed to return from a routine training flight over territory in the Tsingtao area of Shantung Province, China. The two men were members of the United States Naval Headquarters which was established at Tsingtao at the request of the Government of the Republic of China.

Since receiving reports that the flyers were in territory controlled by the Chinese Communists, the Department of the Navy, through the United States Naval Headquarters at Tsingtao, and the Department of State, through its representatives at Nanking, Peiping, and Tsingtao, have made repeated attempts to obtain from the Chinese Communists information concerning the men and to secure their release. These initial approaches have been unsuccessful although Smith and Bender have been reported to be safe and well. The matter is again being brought to the attention of the highest Chinese Communist authorities at Peiping.

The Departments of State and Navy remain in contact with the relatives of the two servicemen and will convey to them any additional information which is received.

Consulate General in Hankow To Close

[Released to the press September 9]

The Department of State announced on September 9 that the American consulate general in Hankow has been instructed to close and withdraw all personnel and that the staffs of the American Embassy in Nanking and of the American consulate general in Shanghai are to be reduced by about one-half. These reductions will be carried out when arrangements have been completed for the transportation from China of Americans and other foreigners who wish to depart.

The decision to take these actions is based upon the same factors which led to a decision to close the American consulate general in Canton.¹

Through the generous agreement of the British

Government, the custody of United States official property in areas of China in which American consular establishments are closed will be assumed by the local British consulate, which will also extend to American citizens the same protection afforded British subjects. The local American communities will form committees with which the British consular offices will deal in routine matters affecting American nationals in order that the added burdens imposed upon the British officers will be no greater than necessary.

These arrangements are already in effect in the Canton and Tihwa consular districts and will take effect in the Hankow district when the American consular establishment in that city is closed.

Should other American consular establishments in China be confronted by a situation similar to that which led to the decision to close the American consulate general in Canton, it is expected that such establishments will also be closed and the custody of United States official property and the protection of American nationals be assumed by the local British consulates.

Howard University Players Leave for Scandinavian Tour

Twenty-one Howard University students accompanied by three faculty members will leave New York on the *S. S. Stavangerfjord* on August 31 to make a series of guest performances in Norway, Denmark, and Sweden at the invitation of the Norwegian Government. Appearances will be on a nonprofit basis with income from ticket sales covering all of the group's expenses while in Scandinavia. Transportation costs have been met by funds made available through the offices of the Norwegian cultural attaché and through the generosity of a private donor, Blevins Davis, who sponsored the first appearance of American actors at Denmark's International Hamlet Festival at Elsinore, Denmark, in June of this year.

The plays which will be presented are *The Wild Duck* by Henrik Ibsen and *Mamba's Daughters* by DuBose Heyward. Under the direction of Dr. Anne Cooke, the Howard University Players will open their tour in mid-September with a 6-day appearance at the New Theater in Oslo. On September 19, they will go to Copenhagen to play there and then tour the provinces. The first 2 weeks in October the company will play in Stockholm. During the last 2 weeks of October and the first 2 weeks of November, they will perform in Trondheim, Stavanger, and Bergen.

The University of Bergen has invited the American group to visit the school, and Dr. Cooke reports that the Players are rehearsing Strindberg's *Miss Julie* for a possible informal presentation there.

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 29, 1949, p. 318.

Iran Signs Educational Exchange Agreement

[Released to the press September 1]

Iran and the United States on September 1 signed an agreement under the Fulbright Act, putting into operation the program of educational exchanges authorized by Public Law 584 (79th Congress).

The signing took place in Tehran, with Foreign Minister Ali Asghar Hekmat representing the Government of Iran and Ambassador John C. Wiley representing the United States.

This agreement was the twelfth signed under the act, previous agreements having been signed with the Governments of China, Burma, the Philippines, Greece, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Luxembourg, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway.

The agreement provides for a United States Commission for Cultural Exchange between Iran and the United States to assist in the administration of the educational program financed from certain funds resulting from the sale of United States surplus property to that country. It provides for an annual program of the equivalent of approximately 300 thousand dollars in rials for certain educational purposes. These purposes include the financing of "studies, research, instruction, and other educational activities of or for citizens of the United States of America in schools and institutions of higher learning located in Iran or of nationals of Iran in United States schools and institutions of higher learning located outside the continental United States . . . including payment for transportation, tuition, maintenance, and other expenses incident to scholastic activities; or furnishing transportation for nationals of Iran who desire to attend United States schools and institutions of higher learning in the continental United States . . . whose attendance will not deprive citizens of the United States of America of an opportunity to attend such schools and institutions."

The Commission in Iran will consist of six members, the honorary chairman of which will be the United States Ambassador to Iran. The members of the Foundation will include three citizens of Iran and three citizens of the United States.

After the members of the Commission in Iran have been appointed, information about specific opportunities for American citizens to pursue study, teaching, or research in that country will be

made public. Further inquiries about those opportunities and requests for application forms should be addressed to the following three agencies: Institute of International Education, 2 West 45th Street, New York 19, N.Y. (for graduate study); United States Office of Education, Washington 25, D.C. (for teaching in national elementary and secondary schools); and the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, 2101 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington 25, D.C. (for teaching at the college level, for postdoctoral research, and for teaching in American elementary and secondary schools in Iran).

U. S. Navy Vessels Sent in Support of Joint Weather Station Program

[Released to the press September 6]

It was announced in Ottawa and Washington on June 29 that three United States Navy vessels with Canadian representatives aboard would shortly be sailing to the Canadian Arctic regions in support of the Joint Weather Station Program which is being carried out by the Governments of Canada and the United States.

These three ships, the icebreaker U.S.S. *Edisto*, the cargo vessels U.S.S. *Wyandot* and the U.S.S. *LST 533*, which served as a cargo vessel have now returned to east coast ports.

During the summer they resupplied the Joint Weather Station established in 1947 on Cornwallis Island, Northwest Territories, for redistribution to other joint weather stations at Prince Patrick Island, Ellef Ringnes Island, and Ellesmere Island. The cargo was unloaded by naval personnel in 89 hours in spite of the difficulties imposed through the necessity of running the cargo ashore over a 2-mile stretch of open sea by means of small landing craft.

The U.S.S. *Edisto* carried two helicopters, which were used extensively and to great advantage on ice reconnaissance missions.

The ships which participated in the supply mission were under the command of Capt. Basil Rittenhouse, United States Navy, embarked in the U.S.S. *Edisto*. The *Edisto* was commanded by Commander W. F. Morrison, United States Navy, the *Wyandot* by Capt. T. S. Webb, United States Navy, and the *LST 533* by Lt. J. E. Vautrot, United States Navy. The senior Canadian representative who participated in the supply mission was J. W. Burton of the Arctic Division of the Northwest Territories Administration, Ottawa.

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Contributors

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